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Nanotechnology has emerged as a major science and technology focus of the 21st century. 
Proponents assert that military applications of nanotechnology have even greater potential than 
nuclear weapons to radically change the balance of power internationally. The suggestion that 
nanotechnology will enable a new class of weapons that will alter the geopolitical landscape 
remains to be realized. A number of unresolved security puzzles underlying the emergence of 
nanotechnology have implications for international security, defense policy, and arms control 
regimes.  
 
This research gives the first systematic analysis of this new technology’s role and significance in 
security and foreign policy and contributes to the development of similar frameworks toward 
designing policy responses to address the promise and perils of nanotechnology, biotechnology, 
and other emerging sciences. This work accomplished two related ends: review and analysis of 
the current state of nanotechnology efforts in Russia in the context of military technology 
development. Although not included in this report, similar reviews by the author were done 
previously for the European Union and concurrently for China. These analyses are part of a 
larger comparative effort of nanotechnology for international security, including the United 
States, Turkey, Israel, Iran, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore.  
 
Second, a set of variables was developed, tested, revised, and assessed in the context of a single 
foreign state. Limiting the proliferation of unconventional weapons for the 21st century starts 
with an awareness of the factors driving the capabilities, the changing natures of technological 
progress and of warfare, and the relationship between science and international security. This 
work establishes a codified variable approach to the development of strategically significant 
nanotechnology and emerging science programs, with the eventual goal of enabling cross-
national comparisons and an understanding of their impact on security; to better enable 
mechanisms for the world to govern the implications of its own ingenuity; and to inform 
security, defense, and foreign policies. Critical factors in the role and significance of emerging 
technologies (e.g., institutional, ideational, and technical) have been identified.  
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Submission of the analytic report of the study’s results, which advances critical thinking on the 
potential role and impact of nanotechnology and emerging science on defense, follows.  
Margaret E Kosal – Military Applications of Nanotechnology: Implications for Strategic Security 
	  
5	  
Part I. Introduction and the Project’s Broader Importance  
 
In order to understand the changing paradigms for national security in the 21st century, it is 
crucial that policymakers and analysts have an awareness of the factors driving new and 
emerging capabilities, possess the ability to analyze the changing nature of technological 
progress and assess potential impacts on the nature of conflict, and understand the relationships 
among cutting-edge science, advanced technology, and international security. What are the roles 
and significance of emerging technologies and how should the national security community 
respond to the promise and perils of biotechnology, nanotechnology, the cognitive 
neurosciences, advanced information and computing sciences, and other emerging technologies? 
How will these nascent scientific and technological developments impact local, regional, and 
international security, stability, and cooperation? What are the most likely sources of 
technological surprise with the largest threat capacity and how can the national security 
community better identify them sooner? Emerging technologies present regional security 
challenges and may exacerbate (or mitigate) the geo-political, military, energy, and economic 
challenges in the future to a state or region and the potential impacts on U.S. interests and 
national security. Deep strategic and practical understanding of the significance of emerging 
technology and its diffusion as well as extending thinking concerning how science, technology, 
and inter- and intra-national social relations interact to shape and facilitate management of the 
changing global security landscape is a pressing need for the 21st century. To that end, the 
Georgia Institute of Technology and the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs was funded to 
pursue initial research on “Military Applications of Nanotechnology: Implications for Strategic 
Cooperation & Conflict” to complement the efforts of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and 
its Center on Contemporary Conflict (CCC) as part of the Project on Advanced Systems and 
Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC). Submission of an analytic report of the study’s results 
follows. 
 
Emerging innovations within today’s most cutting-edge science and technology (S&T) areas are 
cited as carrying the potential of bringing the future envisioned to bring both near-term 
capabilities, as well as those that might appear scientific fictions, closer. Those S&T areas 
include nanotechnology: robotics, including artificial intelligence; the cognitive neurosciences; 
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biotechnology, including systems biology; and the intersection of each with information and 
communications technologies (ICTs). 
 
Less predictable is the possibility that research breakthroughs will transform the 
technological battlefield. Allies and partners should be alert for potentially 
disruptive developments in such dynamic areas as information and 
communications technology, cognitive and biological sciences, robotics, and 
nanotechnology [emphasis added]…. The most destructive periods of history 
tend to be those when the means of aggression have gained the upper hand in the 
art of waging war.1 
 
New and unpredicted technologies are emerging at an unprecedented pace around the world. 
Communication of those new discoveries is occurring faster than ever, meaning that the unique 
ownership of a new technology is no longer a sufficient position, if not impossible. In today’s 
world, recognition of the potential applications of a technology and a sense of purpose in 
exploiting it are far more important than simply having access to it.2 Advanced technology is no 
longer the domain of the few.  
 
“What keeps me awake at night is, are we going to miss the next big technological 
advance? And perhaps an enemy will have that.”3 
 
Anticipating the types of threats that may emerge as science and technology advance, the 
potential consequences of those threats, the probability that new and more diverse types of 
enemies4 will obtain or pursue them, and how they will impact the future of armed conflict is 
necessary in preparing for the future security of the nation. The potential synergies among the 
information and communications technologies, biotechnology, and other emerging technologies, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in 
Lisbon, 19–20 November 2010, http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html 
2 National Research Council, Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, National Academies 
Press, Washington DC, 2006. 
3 General Robert Cone, Commander, U.S. Army TRADOC, from Mike Morones, “Interview with GEN Robert 
Cone,” Defense News, 16 December 2013.  
4 Beyond traditional state-based adversaries, threats are increasing from non-state actors, including terrorists, see 
e.g., State Dept, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, Chapter 
4: The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism, released 30 
May 2013, and other “converging” transnational actors that might seek to acquire and use CBRN weapons.  
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like nanotechnology and the cognitive neurosciences, not only suggest tremendous potential for 
advancement in technology for military applications, but also raise new concerns. When asked 
what are the current approaches and thinking on means for deterring emerging technologies of 
concern to the U.S., then-outgoing U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Commander 
General Robert Kehler, U.S. Air Force (USAF), responded, “surprise is what keeps me up at 
night” and cited current uncertainty in how to assess and address emerging and disruptive 
technologies.5 In the 21st century, both nation-states and non-state actors will have access to new 
and potentially devastating dual-use technology. Intelligence analysts need to be able to 
understand and appreciate the gaps between the emerging technologies and the operational world 
that are crucial for devising implementable and executable strategies that will better enable the 
intelligence community to be prepared for challenges of the future. Robust education and 
research that bridges the gaps between the life and physical sciences, engineering, the social 
sciences, and the operational world is crucial for devising implementable and executable 
strategies that will better enable the U.S. to be prepared for future challenges. 
 
Nanotechnology—which broadly encompasses the design, creation, synthesis, manipulation, and 
application of functional materials and systems through control of matter at the atomic and 
molecular levels—is emerging as the major focus of scientific and technological innovation for 
the 21st century. Although surrounded by popular hyperbole in the 1980s and 1990s associated 
with the specter of self-replicating assemblers,6 nanotechnology and related innovations in 
materials, electronics, optics, biomedical applications, pharmacological formulations, fabrics, 
and super-strong protective coatings are now coming to practical fruition. Engineered 
nanoparticles, for example, are currently used in a number of commercial products, including 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Comments at the “Sustaining the Triad: the Enduring Requirements of Deterrence” Conference, 8 November 2013, 
Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia. Event was unclassified but not open to the public. 
6 K. Eric Drexler, “Molecular Engineering: An Approach to Time Development of General Capabilities for 
Molecular Manipulation,” Proceedings of the National Academies of Science (PNAS), 78, 1981, 5275–5278; K. 
Eric Drexler, Engines of Creation, AnchorPress/Doubleday: New York, 1986; and K. Eric Drexler, “The Road 
to Advanced Nanotechnologies,” presentation at the National Academy of Sciences Sackler Colloquia on 
Nanomaterials in Biology and Medicine: Promises and Perils, Washington, DC, 10–11 April 2007, 
http://www.nasonline.org/site/PageNavigator/SACKLER__nanoprobes_program  
While Eric Drexler has professionally reemphasized the fundamental limits of physics relating to nano-
engineered devices, he now emphatically distancing himself from the self-replicating “nano-bots” notion while 
still advocating for consideration of safety in generation of nano-assembled material, and he acknowledges the 
unexpected and unintended hyperbole that arose with the “grey goo” concept. Nonetheless, molecular self-
assembly remains a topic of popular media, scholarly, and policy discussions. 
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cosmetics, sunscreens, clothes, photovoltaics (solar cells), sporting good, paints and coatings, 
pharmacologicals, and electronics.7 Nanomaterials are being produced on the ton-scale globally.8 
Nanotechnology also is expected to advance medical diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccines, and 
computing. Proponents assert varying scenarios that nanotechnology will revolutionize life as we 
know it through economic and global prosperity9 or that military applications of nanotechnology 
have even greater potential than nuclear weapons to radically change the balance of power 
internationally.10  
 
For scholars of science and technology studies, the intersection of new technology and weapons 
application has a rich literature.11 Within international security, similarly there is a rich literature 
exploring the intersection of science, technology, and understanding the outcomes of armed 
conflict.12 For strategists and scholars of revolutions in military affairs (RMA)13 and of fourth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 National Research Council, A Matter of Size: Triennial Review of the National Nanotechnology Initiative, National 
Academies Press: Washington, DC, 2006. 
8 D Hwang, “Lux Research Nanomaterials: The Rise of MWNTs: Oversupply Hides Real Opportunities,” 20 July 
2010, http://www.nanolawreport.com/2010/07/articles/carbon-nanotubes/webinar-the-rise-of-mwnts/  
9 J Wolfe, “Decoding Future Nanotech Investment Success,” Forbes/Wolfe Nanotech Report, 10 October 2000, 
http://www.forbes.com/2002/10/10/1010soapbox.html  
10 David E. Jeremiah, “Nanotechnology and Global Security,” Palo Alto, CA; Fourth Foresight Conference on 
Molecular Nanotechnology, 9 November 1995. 
11 For example, an incomplete selection includes FA Long and J Reppy (eds.), The Genesis of New Weapons: 
Decision Making for Military R&D, Pergamon Press: New York, 1980; G Spinardi, “Defence Technology 
Enterprises: A Case Study in Technology Transfer,” Science and Public Policy, 1992, 19, 198–206; H 
Gusterson, “A Pedagogy of Diminishing Returns: Scientific Intuition Across Three Generations of Nuclear 
Weapons Science,” in D Kaiser (ed.), Pedagogy and the Practice of Science: Historical and Contemporary 
Perspectives, MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 2005, 75–107; J Reppy, “Managing Dual-Use Technology in an Age 
of Uncertainty,” The Forum, 2006, 4, article 2; BC Hacker and M Hacker, American Military Technology: The 
Life Story of Technology, Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 2006. 
12 F Seitz and RD Nichols, Research and Development and the Prospects for International Security, Crane, Russak 
& Company, Inc: New York, 1973; M Van Creveld, Command in War, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 
1985; SP Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 
1991; EB Skolinikoff, The Elusive Transformation: Science, Technology, and the Evolution of International 
Politics, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1993; E Solingen, Scientists and the State: Domestic Structures 
and the International Context, University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor, 1994; J Arquilla, Networks and 
Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, 2002; PM Cronin 
(ed.), Impenetrable Fog of War: Reflections on Modern Warfare and Strategic Surprise, Praeger Security 
International: Westport CT, 2008; and S Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern 
Battle, Princeton University Press: Princeton. 2004; TG Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence 
and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918–1941, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 2009; and ME O’Hanlon, The 
Science of War, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2009. 
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and fifth generation warfare (4GW & 5GW),14 the nexus between technology and military affairs 
is not just speculation but a reality that bears directly on the propensity for conflict and outcomes 
of war, as well as the efficacy of security cooperation and coercive statecraft. Within today’s 
most cutting-edge scientific and technological innovations—nanotechnology, biotechnology, and 
the cognitive sciences—emerging research is cited as carrying the potential of bringing the future 
envisioned in many utopian and dystopian scientific fictions closer. This research probes the 
potential for transforming the future offense-defense balance in international security, with 
attendant implications for arms racing, strategic stability, and international efforts to limit the 
spread of new weapons.  
 
From the chlorine gas attacks of World War I to the use of atomic weapons against Japan in 
WWII through the biological threats of the Cold War and to the present day, limiting the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 SJ Blank, “The Soviet Strategic View: Ogarkov on the Revolution in Military Technology,” Strategic Review, 
Summer 1984, 12, 3–90; DR Herspring, “Nikolay Ogarkov and the Scientific-Technical Revolution in Soviet 
Military Affairs,” Comparative Strategy, 1987, 6, 29–59; WJ Perry, “Desert Storm and Deterrence,” Foreign 
Affairs, Fall 1991, 70, 66–82; AF Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” 
The National Interest, Fall 1994, 37, 30–42; J McKitrick, J Blackwell, F Littlepage, G Kraus, R Blanchfield, 
and D Hill, “The Revolution in Military Affairs,” in BR Schneider and LE Grinter (eds.), Battlefield of the 
Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, Air University Press: Maxwell AFB, AL, 1995; JS Nye, Jr and WA 
Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs, March–April 1996, 75, 20–36; EA Cohen, “A 
Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs, March-April 1996, 75, 37–54; J Arquilla and SM Karmel, “Welcome 
to the Revolution … In Chinese Military Affairs,” Defense & Security Analysis, December 1997, 13, 255–269; 
AH Bernstein and M Libicki, “High-Tech: The Future Face of War? A Debate,” Commentary, January 1998, 
105, 28–31; FW Kagan, “High-Tech: The Future Face of War? A Debate,” Commentary, January 1998, 105, 
31–34; J Arquilla, Worst Enemy: The Reluctant Transformation of the American Military, Ivan R. Dee: 
Lanham, MD, 2003; TG Mahnken and JR FitzSimons “The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward 
the Revolution in Military Affairs,” Naval War College Newport papers no. 17, 2003, DoD Office of Force 
Transformation, Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, November 2003; EO Goldman and TG 
Mahnken (eds.), The Information Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia, Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2004; 
AA Nofi, Recent Trends in Thinking About Warfare, CNA Corporation, September 2006, 
http://www.cna.org/documents/D0014875.A1.pdf; and TG Mahnken, Technology and the American Way of 
War Since 1945, Columbia University Press: New York, 2010. 
14 WS Lind, “Defending Western Culture,” Foreign Policy, Fall 1991, 84, 41–50; WS Lind, K Nightingale, JF 
Schmitt, JW Sutton, and GI Wilson, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps 
Gazette, October 1989, 2–11; TX Hammes, “The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps 
Gazette, 1994, 35–41; WS Lind, “Understanding Fourth Generation War,” Military Review, September-October 
2004, 84, 12–16; GS Katoch, Fourth Generation War: Paradigm For Change, Master’s Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 2005, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA435502; JW Bellflower, “4th 
Generation Warfare,” Small Wars Journal Magazine, February 2006, 4, 27–33; TX Hammes, The Sling and the 
Stone: On War in the 21st Century, Zenith Press: Minneapolis MN, 2006; TX Hammes, “Fourth Generation 
Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges,” Military Review, May-June 2007, 14–21; T Benbow, “Talking ‘Bout Our 
Generation? Assessing the Concept of ‘Fourth-Generation Warfare,’” Comparative Strategy, March 2008, 27, 
148–163; MJ Artellia and RF Deckrob, “Fourth Generation Operations: Principles for the ‘Long War’,” Small 
Wars & Insurgencies, June 2008, 19, 221–237; JF McKenzie, Jr., “Elegant Irrelevance: Fourth Generation 
Warfare,” Parameters, Autumn 1993, 51–60; and JA Echevarria, Fourth Generation War and Other Myths, 
November 2005, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.  
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proliferation of unconventional weapons enabled by technological innovation has been and 
remains a significant international issue. The last decade, however, has brought an intersection of 
two key drivers that suggest the need for new ways to understand and assess the implications of 
new and emerging technologies and the potential ramifications for proliferation of new and 
unconventional weapons. The first, the changing nature of global security threats, began with the 
fall of the Soviet Union and was punctuated by the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001. Second 
is the shifting nature of technological progress, which brings entirely new capabilities, many of 
which are no longer the exclusive domain of a few large states. These drivers offer new 
opportunities and new challenges for defense, arms control, nonproliferation, cooperation, and 
the security community. 
 
In the post-Cold War environment, possessing the most technologically advanced military power 
no longer guarantees national security. Globalization and the information revolution, including 
the Internet and other communication leaps, have led to much greater visibility into the 
availability and potential for technology.15 New technological developments have become 
accessible and relatively inexpensive to a larger number of nations and within the grasp of non-
state actors; advanced technology is no longer the domain of the few.16 In the 21st century, both 
nation-states and non-state actors may have access to new and potentially devastating dual-use 
technology. 17 Nanotechnology is one such emerging technology that has dual-use applications.18 
Understanding these changing paradigms and limiting the proliferation of unconventional 
weapons for the 21st century starts with an awareness of the factors driving the capabilities, 
understanding the underlying science and the challenges of defense, considering the changing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 JK Rennstich, The Making of a Digital World: The Evolution of Technological Change and How It Shaped Our 
World, Palgrave MacMillan: New York, 2008. 
16 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Unclassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence 
Estimate, ‘Prospects for Iraq’s Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead,’” 2 February 2007.  
17 National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, 
National Academies Press: Washington, DC, 2004, and National Research Council, National Academy of 
Sciences, Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, National Academies Press: 
Washington, DC, 2006. 
18 For this research, dual use and the dual-use conundrum refers to the fact that almost all the equipment and 
materials needed to develop dangerous or offensive agents, particularly biological and chemical agents, have 
legitimate uses in a wide range of scientific research and industrial activity, including defensive military uses. 
Within this text it does not refer to the demarcation between civilian and military uses.  
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nature of technological progress and the changing nature of warfare, and the relationship 
between science and security domestically and internationally. 
 
Communication of those new discoveries is occurring faster than ever, meaning that the unique 
ownership of a piece of new technology is no longer a sufficient position, if not impossible. It is 
widely regarded that recognition of the potential applications of a technology and a sense of 
purpose in exploiting it are far more important than simply having access to it today. 19 
Technological surprise has and will continue to take many forms. A plethora of new technologies 
are under development for peaceful use but may have unintended security consequences and will 
certainly require innovative countermeasures. For example, tremendous developments in 
biotechnology have occurred since the advent of recombinant DNA and tissue culture-based 
processes in the 1970s. If the potential for biotechnology to affect fundamental security and 
warfighting doctrines had been more clearly recognized twenty years ago, the situation today 
could be very different. Defense against biological weapons—from both state and non-state 
actors—currently presents a threat that is difficult to predict and for which traditional solutions 
are increasingly less effective. In a parallel way, nanotechnology has arisen as a rapidly 
emerging and well-funded discipline that has been painted as a ground-breaking technology with 
potential for unpredictable harm.  
 
Reducing the risk from misuse of technology will mean consideration of the highly transnational 
nature of the critical technology required. Traditional and innovative new approaches to 
nonproliferation and counterproliferation are important policy elements to reduce the risk of 
malfeasant application of technology that may enable advanced weapons or make production or 
dissemination of biochemical agents available to a much wider group of actors. Efforts to 
strengthen existing international regimes to control transfers of dual-use materials are 
important.20 Verification still remains a technical as well as a diplomatic challenge. The role of 
international agreements and cooperative programs in the 21st century is a contested intellectual 
and policy field. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 General Charles C. Krulak, USMC (ret), “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines 
Magazine, January 1999.  
20 Margaret E. Kosal, “U.S. Policies to Reduce the Threat of Chemical Terrorism,” Prepared for The Partnership for 
a Secure America, 9/11 + 6 Initiative Foreign Policy Priorities for a Secure America, May 2008. 




The research underlying the findings in this report, which are part of a larger program, were 
based on a variety of sources: prior scholarly and technical analysis and study, commercial 
reporting, government documents, field research, and in-person meetings. Of particular 
importance was attendance at international scientific meetings at which basic and applied 
scientific research was presented, such as the Nanotechnology for Defense (NT4D 2013) 
conference in Tucson, Arizona, and the Second International Conference on Advanced Complex 
Inorganic Nanomaterials (ACIN 2013) in Namur, Belgium.  
 
The Nanotechnology for Defense (NT4D) Conference is an annual U.S. domestic event bringing 
together scientists and engineers from defense service laboratories (U.S. and allies), universities, 
small business, and industry who are working on applications of nanotechnology for national 
defense capabilities. Initiated a decade ago by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), Army 
Research Laboratory (ARL), the Office of Naval Research (ONR), the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency (DTRA), and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the NT4D 
Conference remains the premier event to address emerging and nanotechnologies for defense.  
 
The Second International Conference on Advanced Complex Inorganic Nanomaterials (ACIN 
2013) provided an excellent perspective internationally into state-of-the-art work being 
performed in one area (therefore a “boundable” problem set) of nanotechnology research. 
Highlights with military applications included:  
• Spintronics, i.e., spin transport electronics, i.e., using the inherent spin of 
electrons and magnetic moment, in metals usually, to move electrons [charge] 
where and how you want it; 
• Synthesis and coagulation activity of polyphosphate-coated silica nanoparticles to 
stop hemorrhages and uncontrolled bleeding, i.e., improvements on the type of 
materials used in HemeCon and Q Quik Clot, which have previously been used by 
the U.S. Department of Defense; 
• Porous coordination polymers and metal organic frameworks, i.e. designing and 
assembling molecular scale Tinkertoys that do things such as store, transport, 
catalyze, or separate other gas or liquid molecules;  
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• Atomic understanding of nanomaterials, which featured research on novel ways 
and novel applications of traditional means to understand the basic structure of 
nanomaterials; 
• Next generation optical storage using gold nanorods;  
• New research on harnessing the triboelectric effect, which is the charge generated 
by the friction of two materials rubbing, sliding, and/or rotating against each 
other. Moving beyond piezoelectrics. Generating power from motion of life, i.e., 
nanomaterials in soles of shoes as one walks or woven into backpack as one 
walks. Usually the energy generated is just lost as heat; these materials convert 
the energy generated to electric charge that can be captured or stored, as in a 
battery, or used for things like generating light or amplifying sound;  
• Miniaturized—micro- and nano-scale—generators of electricity from 
piezoelectric, piezotronic, and triboelectric materials. These are the kind of 
breakthroughs in energy generation and storage that are necessary (but not really 
possible through traditional macro- and meso-scale batteries) to enable swarming 
capabilities; and 
• Synthesis, characterization, and ab initio modeling of asymmetric-substituted 
metalloporphyrins for dye-sensitized photovoltaics (solar cells) on nano-
structured TiO2 substrates.  
 
Participation in ACIN 2013 enabled discussions with researchers from the Gubkin Russian State 
University of Oil and Gas Center for NanoDiagnostics; the Russian Academy of Sciences; the 
Baikov Institute of Metallurgy and Materials Sciences; the Tomsk University Institute of 
Catalysis; Tomsk State University; Lomonosov Moscow State University; St Petersburg State 
University; Novosibirsk State University; National Research Nuclear University (MEPI); St 
Petersburg State University of Information Technologies, Mechanics and Optics; Bauman 
Moscow State Technical University; and the Chelyabinsk State University. 
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When examining the literature about Russian innovation, it is difficult to separate scholarship 
produced during the Cold War from contemporary literature. This is a consequence both of the 
remnants of Soviet government (people, institutions, structures) and culture that color the 
Russian Federation today as well as the sheer volume of literature on the subject produced by 
military and academic scholars during the decades-long arms race. This section will attempt to 
outline the variety of approaches to this topic that have helped shape both Western and Russian 
scholars’ understanding of these phenomena. It will begin with a brief overview of scholarship 
about the Soviet process of innovation and then summarize the work of contemporary scholars 
attempting to make sense of the current Russian system of innovation. 
 
Scholarship regarding military and technological innovation within the Soviet Union provides an 
interesting insight into the evolution of Western opinions toward Russia. Many scholars, as 
exemplified by those at the academic-policy intersection, such as McNamara, Kaysen, and 
Rathjens,21 center their theories about Soviet innovation squarely in the predominant theoretical 
model of the time: realism. All three of these men—like many other realist scholars—approach 
their subject with a particular conceit; they believe that the arms race between the United States 
and Soviet Union stemmed from a sense of competition between the two states, and wrote 
dozens of articles illustrating how this model shaped the politics of the Cold War and how it 
should shape relations between the two countries in the future. Beginning in the 1970s, however, 
another program of research began to emerge on this subject. Rather than focus on the military 
capabilities of individual countries, these scholars sought to understand the connection between a 
state’s military innovation capabilities and various cultural factors. Adam Grissom’s review of 
the literature in this area examines six avenues: civil-military, intraservice, interservice, cultural, 
top-down, and bottom-up.22 Many later prominent scholars of Soviet military innovation fall 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Carl Kaysen, Robert S. McNamara, and George W. Rathjen, “Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War,” Foreign 
Affairs, Fall 1991, 70 (4), 95–110. 
22 Adam Grissom, “The Future of Military Innovation Studies,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 2006, 29 (5), 905–934. 
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squarely into the cultural sector of research. Dima Adamsky attributes the pattern of Soviet 
innovation following American innovation to the structure of the Soviet military itself. In his 
view, the highly centralized, administrative structure of the military meant that any decision to 
begin development of a new weapon or weapons system came from the military.23 As such, 
Soviet military innovation was entirely dependent on the leaders’ perception of American 
military strategy. Matthew Evangelista, as an example of another approach, also attributes Soviet 
innovation to a set of particular cultural ideals, but he focused on how these ideals were codified 
in the larger structure of the Soviet military.24 His work is particularly interested in the 
intersection of the Soviet military’s tradition of suffering as a precursor to strength and 
forbearance and the prevailing political notion of communism. It is here, in this gray area, that 
one is able to account for the Soviet military’s inability to capitalize on its understanding of the 
coming revolution in military affairs (RMA) that the leadership predicted but could not 
implement. 
 
Scholarship about contemporary Russian innovation draws heavily on existing commentary on 
innovation in the Soviet Union. This is largely due to the hybrid nature of the current 
government structure. Slavo Radosevic, a prolific author on this subject, attributes the current 
state of the Russian government to the country’s conflicting desires to both retain the remnants 
of the Soviet Union in the government structure and to reform the government entirely.25 As 
such, authors seem to find it difficult (or impossible and ahistorical) to explain the Russian 
government of today without accounting for its past. Uvarov Alexander and Perevodchikov 
Evgeniy attempt to synthesize many of the Russian government’s current innovation efforts by 
examining recent legislation attempting to generate ties between the primary engine of 
innovation in both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation—the independent research 
institute—and universities.26 The difficulty of enacting such change, which seems utterly logical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in 
Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel, Stanford University: Stanford, 2010. 
24 Matthew Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New 
Military Technologies, Cornell University: Ithaca, 1988. 
25 Slavo Radosevic, “Patterns of Preservation, Restructuring, and Survival: Science and Technology in Russia in 
post-Soviet era,” 2003, Research Policy, 32, 1106. 
26 Uvarov Alexander and Perevodchikov Evgeniy, “The Entrepreneurial University in Russia: From Idea to 
Reality,” Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2012, 52, 47. 
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to a Western audience, takes on an entirely new meaning if the role of the university in the 
Soviet Union is understood. A. I. Terekhov has also written a great deal on the evolution of 
science research programs within the Russian Federation.27 Just as Alexander and Evgeniy’s 
analysis of the current state of Russian reforms is meaningless outside of the context of the 
Soviet Union, however, so is Terekhov’s research in this area reliant upon the past. This is due to 
the Russian government’s desire to capitalize upon the country’s enormous population of 
scientists and researchers and to utilize as much of the research that is already being conducted in 
its laboratories as possible to further its desired economic growth.  
 
An exploration of the major authors discussing Russian innovation is incomplete without a 
discussion of the myriad reports being compiled by a number of international organizations. For 
example, the World Bank’s 2011 Igniting Innovation: Rethinking the Role of Government in 
Emerging Europe and Central Asia and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD’s) 2012 Science and Industry Outlook are very different from any of the 
literature mentioned above in that both are less concerned with developing a theoretical model to 
describe past Russian development than exploring and explaining the mechanisms employed 
currently. Igniting Innovation is particularly useful for placing the Russian Federation’s new 
legislation in context, as it includes a very thorough overview of the major structures within the 
Soviet process of innovation.28 Using this structure of as a baseline against which comparisons 
of the current system can be made, the report reinforces the assertions of authors above that the 
current understanding of innovation within the Russian Federation is heavily shaped by past 
efforts. However, it goes on to conclude that the best possible outcome for both the Russian 
economy and investors is the phasing out of government control in the near future. The Science 
and Industry Outlook provides a number of very specific measures of the success of Russia’s 
new plan to enhance innovation within the country and provides an even greater level of context 
than the World Bank report by comparing the findings with those of both OECD member states 
and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). The report highlights both the 
strengths and deficits that exist within the country and provide concrete steps the country can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 A. I. Terekhov, “Evaluating the Performance of Russia in the Research in Nanotechnology,” Journal of 
Nanoparticle Research, 2012, 14(11), article: 1250, 16. 
28 Itzhak Goldberg, John G. Goddard, Samita Kuriakose, and Jean-Louis Racine, “Igniting Innovation: Rethinking 
the Role of Government in Emerging Europe and Central Asia,” The World Bank, 2011, 
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take to capitalize upon its existing investment. Amy Beavin, Anna Bryndza, and Andrew C. 
Kuchins’ report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) succinctly outlines 
the “Concept of Long-term Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Federation,” the 
country’s vision statement for its economic growth until 2020.29 Although ambitious, the 
concept provides an important insight into the sectors of the economy that the Russian 
Federation sees as having the greatest potential for growth in the future. Not only does such 
information provide a vital context for understanding the changes the country is attempting to 
incite, but the CSIS scholars draw upon studies by prominent Russian venture capitalists to 
assess how feasible the concept and its projections are. Their findings are discussed in detail in 
below. 
 
Although the authors and subjects mentioned above are diverse, each fills an important role 
within the literature at large. The Russian Federation is notoriously resistant to sharing 
information about the manner in which their government functions, which gives these authors’ 
work an important weight when attempting to ascertain where the Russian Federation is in 
implementing its plans for the future. It is impossible to synthesize such a large and varied 
literature without omitting important voices on the subject; however, the authors and reports 
included above represent the most widely cited papers in this field. As such, the views and 
arguments can be understood to represent a far larger body of work in each area. 
 
Major Theoretical and Policy Models 
 
Much of the literature summarizing Russian technological innovation is grounded in the decades-
long arms race now known as the Cold War. Although the specific details of the cases addressed 
in these studies may appear outdated, many of these frameworks are useful to the discussion of 
the current state of innovation in Russia because they provide benchmarks by which one can 
compare aspects of contemporary Soviet efforts to innovate. McNamara, Kaysen, and Rathjens’ 
analysis will be summarized first as it provides the most the most straightforward understanding 
of the Soviet Union’s impetus to develop new technology. In this model, Soviet and American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Andrew C. Kuchins, Amy Beavin, and Anna Bryndza, “Russia’s 2020 Strategic Economic Goals and the Role of 
International Integration,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008.  
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leaders were locked in an endless cycle of one-upmanship that the authors refer to as the “action-
reaction” dynamic of innovation between the two states. Adamsky’s strategic culture model 
provides a very different perspective on the matter, focusing on Soviet culture as a whole, while 
Evangelista’s five steps in the Soviet military innovation process provide a framework for 
analyzing contemporary government attempts to develop new technology. The section will end 
with insights provided by Slavo Radosevic, who argues that many of the current problems 
plaguing the Russian government’s efforts to streamline innovation lie in its desire to both 
restructure and preserve aspects of the Soviet government that have endured in the wake of the 
Soviet Union’s dissolution.  
 
Of the authors examined in this section, Kaysen, McNamara, and Rathjens had the most direct 
experience with American interaction with the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War. 
Kaysen and Rathjens both served as members of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s 
Defense and Arms Control Program during the 1960s, and McNamara as the United States’ 
Secretary of Defense from 1961–68. It is therefore not surprising to find that their model is the 
most simplistic in its explanation of Soviet military innovation—the necessity of quick decisions 
during this time in history made complex models largely unworkable. In an article entitled 
“Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War,” the authors summarize their understanding of the 
nuclear arms race in one sentence: “The Soviet nuclear buildup was a response to that of the 
United States.”30 Unlike the other theories presented in this section, the authors give no credence 
to the idea that one or a number of cultural factors prevented the Soviet Union from 
implementing the coming military-technical revolution (MTR) that its leaders predicted. Instead, 
they focus explicitly on how the characteristics of the international political sphere at this time 
influenced the behavior of actors. The impetus for such high amounts of resources allocated to 
military technology in both the United States and the Soviet Union was the product of a bipolar 
world in which military innovation—and especially the improvement of states’ nuclear 
capabilities—was seen as the only means of ensuring national security. Both sides, according to 
this theory, labored under the constant fear that a “devastating bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Carl Kaysen, Robert S. McNamara, and George W. Rathjen, “Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War,” Foreign 
Affairs, Fall 1991, 70 (4), 96. 
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might come at any time.31 Rather than address the problem head on, however, both sides 
engaged in a variety of political maneuvers including bluffing about the size of their arsenals, 
which increased tensions on both sides and made competition for the “best” weapons a matter of 
life and death.32 
 
A similar frame of reference appears in a much later article as McNamara attempts to provide 
guidance on how the United States should address and improve relations with Russia and China 
in a post-Cold War world.33 Again, his analysis focuses on the nature of the international system 
as the foundation of his argument. The United States is the greatest power in the international 
system, and, as such, is the “winner” of the Cold War. However, Russia’s desire to modernize 
both its military and its economy is credited to a variety of policies and actions that the United 
States has adopted in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Also cited are three 
“betrayals” that occurred during the 1990s and are especially important. The first, America’s 
expansion of NATO in the late 1990s, violated what the Russians understood to be America’s 
promise not to expand the organization eastward in the wake of the Cold War. Not only did 
NATO expansion break this promise, but it also provided the Russian government evidence that 
the United States was attempting to contain Russia and limit its influence in Europe despite the 
Cold War having ended. Secondly, the Russians understood the “Founding Act” of May 1997 as 
an opportunity to obtain a commitment from the United States and NATO that would “limit the 
expansion NATO’s military capabilities…; disavow any intention to use force against any state 
except in self-defense or unless authorized by the U.N. Security Council; and grant Russia a role 
in NATO’s political decision making.’34 Although Russia secured the first two objectives, its 
failure to accomplish the third led directly to what the authors consider the third betrayal: the 
bombing campaign against Belgrade.35 While the West conceived of this bombing as a means of 
forcing the Serbs to stop the ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo, Russia understood the 
bombing as a flagrant violation of the Founding Act. The violation, in combination with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid., 97. 
32 Ibid., 98. 
33 Robert S. McNamara and James G. Blight, “In from the Cold: A New Approach to Relations with Russia and 
China,” World Policy Journal, 2006, 18 (1), 72. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid.  
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ineffectiveness of the Serbs’ military equipment against NATO forces drove the Russian 
government to improve its conventional weapons so that the country could defend itself against 
potential NATO attacks with something other than nuclear weapons.36 While it is beyond 
McNamara’s thesis, improvements in conventional weapons would extend to investment in new 
materials and capabilities through emerging technologies, like nanotechnology. 
 
While McNamara’s theory does provide a reasonable explanation for the Russian government’s 
mistrust of the United States and its intense focus on improving its conventional weapons 
systems, however, it fails to explain why the Soviet Union was unable to implement the MTR 
that its leadership predicted was underway during the Cold War. If, like McNamara, Kaysen, and 
Rathjens contend, the Soviet Union’s process of innovation was entirely predicated upon its 
desire to keep pace with the United States, it seems reasonable to assume that the military would 
adopt and implement the reforms called for by the General Staff (GS) of the USSR. However, 
the Russian government chose the opposite approach, choosing to engage with the United States 
and enter perestroika. Neither their early article nor McNamara’s 2001 prescription for 
America’s foreign policy toward Russia includes a mechanism to explain this change. As such, it 
is necessary to explore other explanations of this evolution. 
 
In his book The Culture of Military Innovation, Dima Adamsky attributes the differences 
between American and Soviet military innovation to a series of cultural variables rather than 
strictly to military competition. Specifically, he posits that “[t]he relationship between 
technology and military innovation is not deterministic, but rather socially constructed; national 
military tradition and professional cultures interact with technology, affecting the course and 
outcome of military change.”37 Adamsky attributes these cultural differences to differences in 
countries’ strategic culture. The cultural differences he measures include high- versus low-
context communication and the perception of time. The cognitive variables include holistic 
versus dialectical thought and logical verses analytical thought. According to this theory, the 
Soviet Union constituted a “high-context” society that drew frequently on a sense of shared 
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37 Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in 
Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel, Stanford University: Stanford, 2010, 10. 
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history and tradition. Individuals in such a culture express themselves “in indirect, reserved, 
cynical, and vague language, relying on the listener/reader’s ability to grasp the meaning from 
the context.”38 Time is also perceived in a very non-linear manner; individuals’ frequent reliance 
on past experience creates a culture where the present is colored heavily by the past. There is a 
strong sense that “everything will happen in its time” and that “everything is connected to 
everything else.”39 Adamsky claims that this understanding of time leads to workplace behavior 
that is less than ideal for innovation; specifically, he claims that cyclical behavior is common in 
the workplace, meaning that individuals frequently change from one task to another and, though 
they may understand a great deal, do not concentrate on any one task for long periods of time.40 
 
Adamsky goes on to apply these traits to the Soviet military innovation during the Cold War. He 
finds that the military leadership’s understanding of two particular issues heavily shaped their 
response to developing their nuclear program. First, increased mobility of tactical nuclear 
weapons required “friendly forces to be dispersed to avoid enemy nuclear attack.”41 Secondly, 
the Russians now required maneuver forces to mass and break through the enemy’s line without 
allowing NATO to employ nuclear weapons against them in order to gain ground in an offensive 
attack.42 Adamsky traces the roots of truly revolutionary thought to Nikolai Orgarkov, Chief of 
the General Staff of the Soviet Union, who recognized that the latest technological advances 
constituted a “genuine discontinuity in military affairs” that required the exploitation of the new 
technologies to invent new means of conducting military operations.43 While much of the Soviet 
military seemed to understand that improving existing and developing conventional weapons 
provided a more secure means of ensuring second-strike capability, particularly given the 
precision new technologies allowed, the Soviets ultimately failed in the implementation of the 
military-technical revolution (MTR). Although the details of the case study are not directly 
applicable to the present, the mechanisms responsible for Russia’s failure to apply the MTR to its 
military strategy provide important insights into Russia’s military. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid., 16. 
39 Ibid.,  17. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid.,  26. 
42 Ibid., 25. 
43 Ibid., 28. 




The first reason Adamsky cites for this failure is the lack of bureaucratic support for Ogarkov’s 
proposals. As the Chief of the GS, Ogarkov had the power and leverage to implement real 
change in the Russian military’s grand strategy. He drew upon a variety of “interrelated 
professional discussions” about NATO’s shift to a “follow-on forces attack,” which was 
designed to attack the enemy as far in the rear as possible.44 Ogarkov claimed that the 
improvements in conventional weaponry by both the Americans and the Soviet Union heralded a 
revolution in military strategy dependent on capabilities. This revolution required the 
exploitation of emerging technologies to “invent innovative means of conducting operations” 
and to adjust force build up in each military service.45 Ogarkov’s writing and thinking co-
evolved with the Soviet military’s gradual recognition that many missions formerly perceived 
only as nuclear missions were increasingly utilizing conventional weapons as well. Even as 
many in the Russian military recognized the wisdom of Ogarkov’s thinking, he “could not 
muster necessary support from the Kremlin, Foreign Ministry, or KGB,” which ultimately led to 
his ouster.46 Without its most vocal leader in a position of real power any longer, the impetus 
behind the change died. 
 
Ogarkov’s failure to garner sufficient bureaucratic support for his ideas is not the only factor in 
the MTR’s failure, however. Adamsky also points to two external factors that colored the general 
military climate at the time in which Ogarkov’s proposals were being circulated. While many 
general officers in the military agreed with his analysis and ideas, the political climate was 
changing. Ogarkov served as the Chief of the GS from the beginning of perestroika. Not only did 
civilians rail against the notion of increasing military budgets any further, many members of the 
government also disagreed. As such, military authorities were unable to exert the kind of 
authority that they had in the past, which ultimately led the military to ignore Ogarkov’s 
proposals and the end of his military career. The lack of support for these policies may also have 
stemmed from a variety of economic factors that were becoming increasingly obvious at this 
time: the Soviet Union never possessed the necessary economic capacity to embark on the kinds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid.  
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of “ambitious military transformations” that Ogarkov proposed.47 As such, even if political will 
had existed at this time, the country’s economic situation made such innovation impossible. 
While Russia is several decades removed from the specific problems addressed in Adamsky’s 
work, the broad strokes of these issues continue to color the government’s policies. As such, the 
model presented here is more applicable than the time period covered would seem. 
 
The impact of the culture of the Russian military on the failure to implement the MTR using the 
cultural variables discussed earlier is also important. Given the larger culture’s tendency toward 
collectivism and to the reliance on history and tradition, Adamsky claims that Russian strategic 
experts saw all problems and issues as interconnected in a single system.48 Rather than a 
strategic or tactical puzzle, however, the Russians understood the “problem” to be solved as a 
moral one. This certitude, combined with a history of suffering domestically and on the 
battlefield, created a culture that propagated the notion that “triumph over insufferable 
circumstances encouraged values of self-restraint and moral and physical fortitude.”49 Because 
suffering was noble and much of Russian military doctrine relied on the notion of human mass as 
a key to military victory, the Soviet military leadership never succumbed to the “techno-
euphoria” that drove the United States to constantly seek the next technological innovation.50 
Adamsky also posits that the Russian military leaders found reinforcement for their actions in the 
pervasive “Marxist dialectics” within the broader culture. Specifically, he points to Marxism’s 
propensity to exist in an “imagined future” where problems are ignored rather than confronted as 
a framework for a military that became “good at theorizing innovative concepts but 
pathologically bad at implementing them.”51  
 
Three negative cultural impacts that influenced the Soviet Union’s ability to implement the MTR 
are identified. First, Adamsky claims that the authoritarian nature of the Russian culture led to 
the creation of military leadership, the GS, that was responsible for planning and executing 
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operations, but also for “synthesiz[ing the] insights of military knowledge.”52 One of the GS’s 
primary tasks was to generate revolutions in military affairs and to determine how they could be 
implemented. The Russian government and Russian military establishment saw the GS as a 
“brain” that not only commanded operations but also distilled military operations from the 
general to the particular. Creating an audience for new MTRs or other new ideas was therefore 
very difficult, particularly given the economic and political climate discussed above. The sense 
of tradition further manifested itself in the general understanding within the Russian military that 
saw suffering as essential to producing fortitude among soldiers and that also attributed military 
success to “men, spiritual power, and psychological factors”53 rather than to improved weapons 
technology or any other material component. Therefore, Ogarkov’s assertion that the Russian 
military needed to invest more money and resources into research and development (R&D) to 
maximize the efficacy of both its nuclear and conventional weapons was not well received. It not 
only flew in the face of both governmental and public desire, but also in the face of prevailing 
military tradition. Lastly, the prevailing military dogma of the day, Marxism, may have impacted 
the military’s ability to implement the MTR. The problem, he claims, comes where Marxism and 
the high-context nature of the Russian culture intersect. Marxism, Adamsky argues, reinforced 
notions of an “imagined future” and also placed particular emphasis on ignoring rather than 
fixing problems. As such, the Russian military was very good at “developing revolutionary 
concepts of modern operations” but never implemented those theories.54 
 
Similar conclusions about Soviet military innovation are reached by Matthew Evangelista 
through a very different process. In his book Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United 
States and Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies, Evangelista argues that Russia was 
a “late, late industrializer” that instituted a “costly campaign of forced-draft industrialization,” 
inadvertently creating a highly centralized government and a very weak society.55 Through 
exploration of the state’s military and history of innovation and comparing it with the United 
States in regards to centralization, complexity, formalization, interconnectedness, and 
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organizational slack, five structural characteristics (variables) “that appear to affect 
organizational innovativeness” are put forward.56 Evangelista argues that, after comparing the 
two states in these areas, the United States’ R&D apparatus makes it inherently more innovative 
because the Soviet Union’s “highly centralized, hierarchal,” system, “characterized by excessive 
secrecy and compartmentalization,” hinders both its ability to innovate and its ability to 
implement those innovations.57 He goes on to distill the military weapons development processes 
into five steps for both countries and applies those steps to both states’ development of tactical 
nuclear weapons.  
 
Evangelista’s first step in Soviet military innovation is known as “stifled initiative.” At this early 
stage in the innovation process, there is evidence of technical antecedents to future military 
innovations and discussion of possible military applications of emerging technologies. However, 
this step is also marked by “organizational and systemic constraints preventing the active pursuit 
of potential developments that do not coincide with existing priorities.”58 This is in direct 
opposition to the same stage in the American military innovation process that is undertaken after 
the independent development of new technology by scientists working in private firms within the 
larger military R&D apparatus.59 Such independent development is impossible in the strict 
administration of the Soviet Union, thus hindering the entire innovation process.  
 
In the second step of the process, “preparatory measures,” low-level efforts in a particular area 
continue, but they still yield to higher-priority programs. Evangelista credits the institution of 
new scientific research to evidence of similar technologies being developed abroad.60 While the 
impetus may not be original, this stage of research is very important for Soviet scientists, 
preparing a technical background that will be useful once development of the technology is 
undertaken in earnest. The third stage of the process, “high-level response,” builds upon this 
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research base to respond to foreign developments. This is a particularly important stage in Soviet 
innovation because it generally indicates the beginnings of a change in Soviet military priorities.  
 
The final two steps, “mobilization” and “mass production,” are similar processes on two 
different scales. In the first step, Soviet leadership typically endorses an all-out effort to pursue a 
particular innovation. The sheer amount of resources dedicated to the development of this 
process allows the system to overcome its typical inertia and make rapid advances in this area. 
However, speed of discovery does not equate to greater freedom for the scientists working on the 
problem. Military leadership retains a remarkable ability to “intervene in the process of carrying 
out an innovation,” even choosing to end further development of a program after extensive 
testing. The final step in the process is the most public, as the government issues both policy 
statements and information about the new technology. This step also is indicative of the current 
priorities of the Russian military establishment. Any changes to the GS’s priorities are 
formalized with these announcements and with the mass production and implementation of a 
new technology.61 
 
As Evangelista moves through his discussion of the Soviet innovation process, the centralization 
of the Soviet system that prevents the scientists who are willing and able to innovate from doing 
so until large-scale structural changes can take place in the leadership’s vision for the future is 
highlighted. Because innovation by scientists central to the success of the United States’ military 
R&D program, this emerges as a crucial element. While the model itself appears to be applicable 
to the current Russian system for R&D, it seems as though scientists may gradually be gaining 
more of a voice in the government’s allocation of funding for the development of various 
research programs. For example, in 2004, the Duma held hearings entitled “Nanotechnology—
The Problems of Development and Training,” part of which consisted of Nobel laureate Z. I. 
Alferov giving a report entitled “Nanostructures and Nanotechnology.”62 This is a small example 
of the kind of process that Evangelista celebrates in the United States, but it might, perhaps, 
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provide fodder for a deeper analysis if more information can be found about this or similar 
incidents. 
 
Both Adamsky’s and Evangelista’s explanations for Russia’s current drive to improve its 
conventional weapons systems include nuances that account for the Russian government’s 
inability to implement the MTR in a manner similar to that of the United States. Although these 
theories contend with a far different set of evidence to support their theories—a product of 
realism’s unwillingness to open the “black box” of domestic politics—the final explanations of 
the Soviet government’s behavior are logical outgrowths of both the historical events examined 
and of larger pressures governing the international system. The GS’s unwillingness to expend 
large amounts of resources on the development of tactical nuclear weapons before the 1970s, for 
example, might suggest the competitiveness that Kaysen, McNamara, and Rathjens rely upon, 
but the examinations of the cultural factors at work within the Russian military in this culture of 
competition provide needed detail for unexpected behavior. Because both of these theories focus 
on past events, however, the applicability of these theories to the current innovation apparatus in 
the Russian Federation needs to be tested. While it retains elements of the Soviet government, 
the government of the Russian Federation is not precisely the same.  
 
Slavo Radosevic’s analysis of the Russian government’s current attempts to spur innovation in 
its economy step into the gap left by theories of Soviet innovation by explaining the extent to 
which the Russian Federation’s current policies are predicated on its past. Arguing that Russia is 
currently in the midst of an innovation crisis due to its desire to both restructure and preserve 
what remains of the Soviet innovation infrastructure, Radosevic argues that there are two major 
problems with continuing to employ this model in the future.63 First, because the Soviet Union 
understood R&D as the main generator of technological innovation, other important aspects of 
the innovation process, such as “the role of users, engineers, and others not directly involved 
with R&D,” were never considered.64 As such, these avenues continue to be neglected by the 
current government. Second, the Soviet government perceived technology as a commodity that, 
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once developed, “could be transferred into or introduced into production without need for 
continuous adaptations and improvements.”65 The latter is not only problematic for continuing to 
foster innovation within the scientific community, but also for the quality of Russian products 
meant to compete on the international stage. Although Radosevic lacks some of the rigorous 
development and details that Adamsky and Evangelista boast—due in large part to the fact that 
these ideas are in articles rather than in a book—his insights dovetail nicely with the conclusions 
of the two other authors and will aid in the analysis of current Russian innovation policies using 
the strategic cultural and five-step innovation models. 
 
Legislation, Policy, and Organizational Structures  
 
Because the Russian R&D apparatus remains highly centralized, the majority of prominent 
organizations encouraging innovation are tied to the government. The Russian government’s 
current approach to innovation in many ways mirrors the process that took place in the Soviet 
Union. Just as the Soviet government funded the bulk of R&D activities through state-owned 
branch research institutes, Russia’s current structure boasts a large network of research institutes 
that are largely separate from both industrial firms and the university system. These institutes, 
known collectively as the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), are more than thirty component 
organizations that publish independently and compete for state funding as individual entities.66 
Among the most prolific of these institutes are the Nesmeyanov Institute of Organoelement 
Compounds RAS, the Federal State Institution (FSI) Technical Institute for Superhard and Novel 
Carbon Materials, Lomonosov Moscow State University (MSU), the Institute of 
Microelectronics Technology and High Purity Materials (IMT) RAS, and the Landau Institute 
for Theoretic Physics (ITP) RAS. While similar institutions can be found throughout Asia, 
Western Europe, and the United States, the model under which Russia’s current innovation 
initiatives is broadly and narrowly reminiscent of what existed under the Soviet Union. One 
hallmark of this model of development is the large gap that exists between the RAS research 
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institutes and the university system.67 As in the past, universities remain responsible for 
educating students without commensurate emphasis on research as is found in U.S. and western 
European research universities. As such, Russia’s research institutes struggle to attract young 
minds to its research (even beyond the challenges of Russian demographic shifts of an aging 
population). This is problematic both because of the increasing need for competent young 
scientists to carry on the research of the aging scientific community and because it may prevent 
many of the mechanisms by which the Russian government hopes to stimulate economic growth 
in the scientific community from being sufficiently successful in the future. 
 
Legislation enacted in the last several years provides evidence that some of the traditional 
government structures responsible for inciting innovation are beginning to be reformed, 
however. While still in the early stages, many of the Russian government’s programs in this area 
seem to aim to increase growth in the private sector rather in particular. In 2005, the government 
passed a law incentivizing the creation of special economic zones (SEZs) to attract investment in 
manufacturing and “high-technology” development.68 Incentives such as tax and customs breaks, 
financial guarantees, and “special credit conditions” are included in the bill for up to ten years as 
long as member corporations are willing to register with the government. After ten years, 
government incentives are lessened considerably in an attempt to ensure that startup corporations 
in these regions are able to function as competitive entities. The law also requires all member 
corporations—including multinational corporations (MNCs)—to submit to the same vetting 
process for residency in the SEZ and to apply for any grants made available to residents of the 
city. MNCs could thus be denied participation in the SEZ if their proposed projects fall outside 
the goals of the technopark associated with the SEZ. Although turning established corporations 
away seems counterintuitive, the government’s oversight in this manner is one of a series of 
legislative necessities associated with successful SEZ. 
 
A second component of successful SEZs was incorporated into Russian law in January 2008 
when the Russian government passed the Federal Law on Science, which allows research 
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institutes and universities to share material resources, workforce, and facilities free of charge.69 
More importantly, the law allows universities and research institutes to form joint entities.  
Law 217 seeks to encourage further collaboration among universities and private industry by 
“encourag[ing] companies to establish partnerships with universities and get engaged in joint 
R&D activities and technological innovations.70 Federal Government Directives 218-220 
provide the legal authority for the collaborations to begin.  
 
• Federal Government Decree 218, “The Federal Support of Cooperation Between 
Higher Education and High Tech Industry (April 9, 2010),” allocated $633 
million between 2010 and 2012 for joint industry-university projects. Selected 
projects could be awarded up to $10 million according to three criteria: 1) that the 
project proposed by a research institution and company must require joint R&D at 
the research institution, 2) that the company will match the government grant with 
its own funding, and 3) that at least twenty percent of federal funding will be used 
for R&D.71 
 
• Federal Government Decree 219, “Federal Support of the Innovation 
Infrastructure Development in the Higher Education Sector (April 9, 2010),” 
sought to support “innovation infrastructure development such as “business 
incubators, engineering centers, certification centers, transfer technology centers, 
information centers, and innovation consulting centers,” as well as for 
entrepreneurial education and technology transfer consulting services.72 All 
research institutions of higher education in Russia are eligible to compete for up 
to $1.7 million per year for three years. 
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• Federal Government Decree 220, “Support of Leading Scientists in the Higher 
Education Sector (April 9, 2010),” allocated $400 million from 2010 to 2012 to 
award grants to researchers that are renewable for up to two years. Researchers 
who were chosen to receive the funding must “form a team, establish a research 
lab, and make [a] contribution to his/her area of research.”73 
 
These joint entities are an important component of successful SEZs in both Western Europe and 
Asia because it allows for more flexibility in research. Furthermore, these collaborations allow 
universities and research institutes to become more responsive to the needs of the market, one of 
the biggest problems that the Soviet innovation system faced prior to its dissolution. For many 
years, the government’s research demands usurped the market’s, meaning that innovation 
occurred outside of the realm of citizens or investors’ wants or needs. Increased collaboration 
between the research institutes and universities is meant to address this problem by providing the 
research institutes an arm that targets consumer needs specifically. Such changes are essential if 
Russia is to stimulate innovation in its economy and keep pace with other BRICS, whom it views 
as its largest competitors. 
 
Just how important continued innovation is for the country was highlighted in a 2007 
government document entitled the “Concept of the Long-term Socioeconomic Development of 
the Russian Federation.”74 Three potential outcomes for Russia are outlined if its efforts to incite 
innovation should fail. The first is the least appealing, outlining a scenario in which Russia 
continues to rely on “the resource export based model of development while the production of 
hydrocarbons gradually decreases.”75 According to this model, Russia becomes increasingly less 
competitive and, as such, income disparities between Russia and its neighbors grow. GDP 
growth is projected to fall to 3.5% by 2015 and will increase only a meager 1.6 times between 
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2008 and 2020.76 The second scenario outlines the potential outcome of Russia improving the 
efficiency of its extracting techniques and power generation in order to maximize the 
productivity and growth in the energy sector.77 Such a breakthrough allows for the 
“diversification in export destinations” and also provides the capital needed to modernize the 
country’s transportation infrastructure.78 Unfortunately, because this represents innovation in 
only one sector of the economy, the government still lacks the ability to provide for development 
and national security, placing it behind its peer competitors.79 Lastly, the government presents its 
vision for “innovation-based development” that allows Russia “to broaden its comparative 
advantage beyond the sphere of energy and natural resources and to become a leader in 
technology as well.”80 Success in this endeavor allows standards of living to improve markedly 
as GDP per capita would rise to $21,000 by 2015 and to $30,000 by 2020.81 Only in this model 
is Russia able to retain its standing on the world stage and its dominance in the region. This 
model and the many changes that it entails are presented as by far the best possible means of 
securing Russia’s future.  
 
In order to succeed in making the final vision a reality, a set of highly ambitious goals to 
promote innovation and economic growth in the country were outlined in the Ministry of 
Economic Development’s “Innovation Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020.”82 The 
strategy’s objectives include: “further develop[ing] human capital, stimulat[ing] innovation 
activities in the business sector, creat[ing] a climate conducive to innovation in the public sector, 
increase[ing] efficiency and dynamism of R&D, and promot[ing] international STI co-
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operation.”83 One such initiative is the State Programme for Development of Science and 
Technology for 2012-20, which has the stated goal of “develop[ing] a competitive and efficient 
sector of applied research and development.”84 This program provides public support for the 
advancement of priority technological advances and for S&T infrastructure that spanned multiple 
technological and business sectors. Support is also provided by a number of government 
agencies including the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Economic 
Development, the High Technology and Innovation Commission, the President’s Commission 
for Modernisation and Technological Development of Russia’s Economy.85 
 
Even as these programs seek to stimulate the economy, however, the continued overwhelming 
reliance on the government as the driver of innovation harkens back to the Soviet apparatus. 
While some steps are being made to loosen the government’s control over many of the major 
institutions within the innovation apparatus, the reality of the country’s current economic state 
and population poses its own problems. While the Soviet Union was long regarded one of the 
leading countries in the number of highly educated individuals within its population—Russia still 
retains one of the best-educated populations in the world according to OECD data—strict 
divisions between the government, military, universities, and research institutes has led to a 
smaller number of science and engineering graduates over the years. Given President Putin’s 
ambitious goals for improving the Russian economy by once again improving the scientific 
community’s ability to innovate, the decreasing population of individuals qualified to take on 
these jobs may halt the project in its tracks if steps are not taken to reverse this trend. Secondly, 
the strong ties between the government and the research institutes mean that all employees are 
considered civil servants and that the resulting laws governing the firing of scientists and 
engineers currently employed in the research institutes are notoriously strict.86 While this might 
have a positive impact on the work that scientists are able to carry out, it also makes replacing 
aging researchers very difficult. Researchers’ civil servant status is also unappealing to many 
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individuals qualified to replace the aging resources due to the comparatively low salaries offered 
to government employees compared to their counterparts in the private sector. Lastly, the 
decreasing number of science and engineering graduates means that research institutes are hiring 
increasingly fewer staff with masters or doctoral degrees. As such, the quality of the work being 
released by these entities is likely to fall. Not only does this not portend well for the current joint 
ventures established in the wake of the 2008 law allowing collaboration, but it also calls into 
question their future sustainability. Both of these considerations could prove disastrous for the 
SEZs slated for development in the country, as the reputation of the corporations participating in 
these startups is a key measure of quality.87 The possibility of investing in a collaboration that 
may or may not have the skilled personnel to carry on the projects in the future is not likely to 
attract much foreign investment, especially when technoparks, some more qualified and stable, 
and other SEZs are thriving in Asia. 
 
Recent Russian Tech Development Programs 
 
As mentioned above, Russia is in a transition period with regard to how it approaches technology 
development. While the government maintains a very active presence in the process of 
technology development, there has been an increasing movement toward decentralization in 
recent years. The decentralization programs proposed thus far, however, retain a distinctly 
Russian sensibility in that decentralization is meant to occur with huge outlays of government 
funding. One such initiative is the State Programme for the Development of Science and 
Technology for 2020, which was passed in December 2012.88 Although this program shares a 
name with a similar program that ended in 2013, this bill visualizes Russian science and 
technology taking on a very different role in the future Russian economy. Rather than seeking to 
simply “recover and sustain the scientific and technological potential of the country,” the 
program allocates 145.12 billion rubles ($3.6 billion USD, at the time) “to make science and 
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technology a driving force of the economy.”89 In order to make Russian science competitive with 
similar programs around the world, several key areas that would ensure efficient use of resources 
are addressed in the document. These include the imbalance between the supply and demand of 
R&D goods that is exacerbated by the insufficient effectiveness of basic science and research; 
the lack of interest and weak participation of the business sector in R&D; the generation gap 
(high average age of researchers) in the sector; the competitiveness of the working conditions for 
scientist and researchers; the poor integration of the Russian R&D sector into the international 
R&D sector; and the obsolescence of the resource base for the R&D sector.90 
 
In order to address the wide range of identified issues, the program encapsulates six subsidiary 
programs and three “Federal Targeted Programmes.” The sub-programs include: “Basic 
research;” “Pre-discovery and applied problem-oriented research and laying scientific and 
technological foundation in the sphere of leading edge technology;” “Development of research 
institutions;” “Development of inter-disciplinary structure of the R&D sector;” “International 
scientific cooperation;” and an administrative program.91 The program will be implemented over 
three stages, the first set to begin in 2013 with the improvement of the state science funding and 
regulation and the clarification of the program itself. The second phase spans from 2014–2017 
and “aims to increase the quality of work of the research institutions, make salaries in the sector 
more competitive, introduce new form (sic) of support of individual R&D work (grants), and 
construct mega-science installations.”92 The last phase will span 2018–2020 and will focus on 
sustaining the gains made in the previous two phases. Although the government remains a major 
part of this initiative, the program, as currently written, relies heavily on competitive funding 
mechanisms to allocate funds to “public and private research institutions, education institutions 
and scientific centres, as well as to individual researchers and PhDs.”93  
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The information technology (IT) industry is one in which the Russian government may most 
quickly see a return on its investment. Although still a very small sector of the economy—it 
employed only 0.6% of the Russian workforce in 2012—it garnered 1.2% of the GDP.94 What 
truly differentiates the IT industry from other branches of Russian governmental innovation is 
that the average age of the workers in that sector is much younger than that of the sciences—
averaging thirty years of age while the average Russian scientist is 53 years old.95 The Russian 
government’s attempts to encourage innovation in this area are equally varied. Although the 
government has attempted to spur growth in this area in the past, the great potential for growth in 
this sector has precipitated a particularly strong drive among government officials to see this 
sector grow. In order to do so, President Putin has begun a process that includes the hallmarks of 
the Russian innovation process while also providing insight into the direction future Russian 
efforts to innovate may take. The following case study will examine this process in detail. 
 
Skolkovo: A Window to Russia’s Future? 
 
In 2010, the Russian Duma approved a proposal to allocate more than $4 billion (in USD at the 
time) to Skolkovo, a three-pronged approach to encouraging innovation that includes a high-tech 
“innovation city” meant to serve as Russia’s answer to Shenzhen in China and India’s largest 
technopark in Thiruvananthapuram (Trivandrum), Kerala; a business incubator for entrepreneurs 
in the technology and applied research sectors (the Skolkovo Foundation); and a “world class 
technology university, Skolkovo Institute of Technology (SKTech).”96 Each of the three parts of 
the effort is intended to perform a role in the innovation process while also working 
collaboratively with the others to draw both domestic and international investors. Since 
construction of the project began, members of the Russian government touted the project as the 
“Russian Silicon Valley.”97 Viktor Vekselberg, the Skolkovo Foundation president, predicts that 
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the city will raise $11 billion through private investors by 2020 and that it will add up to $45 
billion to national GDP.98  
 
How will the city achieve such spectacular growth? The challenge is significant and relies on 
acquiring just the right balance of technology startups and established companies taking up 
residence in the technopark. A widely cited estimate of this ratio is drawn from Finland’s 
successful technoparks: 94% of residents in a technopark should be established and only 6% true 
technology startups.99 After appropriate companies are identified and given permission to take 
part in a technopark, resident companies then research and develop products that can find a 
commercial audience and give a portion of their profits on these technologies in rent and 
taxes.100 Ideally, the success of the first companies to take up residence in a particular 
technopark would then attract new and more profitable companies or investment in the 
companies already in residence. In this way, developments in the technoparks would be absorbed 
into the Russian GDP and provide a much-needed boost to the country’s economic growth.  
 
In the majority of the successful technoparks, resident businesses are initially granted special tax 
incentives or other comparable benefits in exchange for becoming a resident company. Ideally, 
however, this government assistance is eventually discontinued because the technopark is self-
sufficient. Determining the exact point at which a government should begin removing incentives 
from a technopark is far less straightforward than it might seem, however. A recent IEEE 
Technology Management Conference considered this issue and reached only the tentative 
conclusion that while too much focus on the tenants’ research and commercial success can prove 
detrimental to efforts to build the park’s reputation, providing too much state assistance to 
residents can turn an avenue for private sector innovation into “a model for distributing state 
support.”101 The former model can place too much emphasis on the results of investment—
potentially scaring residents away—while the latter can impede any transition to self-sufficiency.  
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On paper, the 2005 SEZ act seems to strike a reasonable balance between the two extremes. 
While the Skolkovo program has received a large amount of government seed money, the 
benefits to residential companies expire after a decade. Although the technopark is in its early 
stages, this provides a definite point at which the self-sufficiency of the resident companies is 
expected. Currently, the law also holds both established corporations and technology startups to 
the same process of government review to ensure that their research is beneficial for Russian 
consumers and that the money being given to the corporation is used wisely. Although such 
measures may seem extreme to established companies, the review process is one way of 
monitoring the government’s investment and of ensuring that the R&D occurring is focused on 
the creation of new technology rather than simply transferring existing technology to Russia. 
International investors are beginning to respond to the program. In August 2012, the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) agreed to partner with the SKTech and work 
alongside prominent Russian universities, including Lomonosov Moscow State University, to 
create a more innovative atmosphere while drawing on the considerable scientific knowledge of 
the partner universities.102  
 
As with most aspects of innovation in Russia, however, the government retains strong ties to the 
project, providing both the seed money to begin construction and also helping to appoint the 
leaders of the Technopark, Skolkovo Foundation, and the Skolkovo Institute of Technology. 
Such close ties call the self-sustainability and independence of the program into question. This 
significant government involvement with the leadership of the program is similar to projects that 
undertaken during the 1950s and 60s under the Soviet government. In 1957, the government 
established Akademgorodok—literally “academic town”—a “science city” that included research 
institutes, a university, housing, entertainment, stores, and other resources for its citizens. Similar 
cities were built near Tomsk in 1972, and a town known as Zelenograd was “repurposed from a 
manufacturing to a high technology city in 1962.”103 Given the Soviet government’s propensity 
for involvement in all major projects, it is likely that government officials held the positions of 
authority within the commercial and research portions of the science cities. The question 
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therefore becomes to what extent is the current Russian model of innovation in this area different 
from that of the Soviet Union? 
 
Applying Evangelista’s five-step process for Soviet innovation to this question reveals surprising 
similarities between the two innovation systems. While step one, “stifled initiative,” seems to be 
corrected by the principles underlining the creation of all three prongs of Skolkovo, the concept 
underlying the second step, “preparatory measures,” has more resonance. While the Skolkovo 
program is a very large, public display of the government’s commitment to innovation in the 
private sector, the five year gap between the passage of the 2005 SEZ law and the passage of the 
bill creating the Skolkovo program could indicate low-level support for the idea within the 
government. Large projects require time to draft, but five years seems quite long given the 
magnitude of success that similar SEZs have achieved in the other BRICS countries. Therefore, 
the lag may indicate hesitancy or a general lack of interest on the part of government leaders. 
 
The third step, “high-level response,” obviously occurred in this process as evidenced both by 
the passage of the law and the subsequent government support, both monetary and verbally in a 
variety of high-profile speeches and conferences. What is unclear about this step, however, is 
whether the push by government officials truly occurred in response to perceived change by peer 
states. Successful SEZs have been a large part of the global economy for many years, especially 
in Asia. If the government decided to make Skolkovo a priority in response to success in areas 
such as Shenzhen, the program took a longer time to pass than would be expected by the model. 
Evangelista’s understanding of this step indicates a fairly rapid response to innovations by other 
countries, but the five-year gap in the Skolkovo process indicates something else may be a 
driving factor. Even taking into consideration the global recession that occurred in 2008, the gap 
seems unusually long. 
 
Because of the size and singular nature of the Skolkovo project, it is difficult to tell if any 
“mobilization” process occurred, or if the concept of “mass production” is more applicable to the 
current rollout of the program. Voting to fund the creation of such a large program, in addition to 
the repeated statements on the part of government leaders indicate that a hybrid of the two steps 
may provide the most comprehensive explanation of the process. For Evangelista, the 
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mobilization process is marked by an all-out government effort to support the creation of a 
needed product. Such support is clearly evidenced here; however, the very public nature of the 
manner in which the program was created—through the passage of a bill in the Duma—also 
provides evidence for the public statements about a given government policy toward new 
technology that are the hallmark of mass production. 
 
Using Evangelista’s model as a template for exploring the development of the Skolkovo program 
indicates a large amount of overlap between the current innovation process and that which 
occurred under the Soviet Union. This is not to say that no differences exist between the two—
the very nature of the Skolkovo program and its emphasis on private sector innovation differs 
substantively from the Soviet model. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that the Russian 
government’s ambitious plans for scientific innovation may be foiled by this close resemblance, 
organizational structure fidelity, and predominance of older individuals.  
 
Such a resemblance is only intensified by a variety of scandals associated with the Skolkovo 
Foundation recently. In February 2013, the Russian Investigative Committee filed criminal 
charges against Kirill Lugovtsev, the Finance Department Director at the Development 
Foundation of the Center for Development and Commercialization of New Technology (the 
Skolkovo Foundation) for the embezzlement of 24 million rubles ($800,000 USD at the time). 
The charges followed the revelation of “materials from the Audit Chamber and the Federal 
Security Service.”104 Charges were still pending even as then-Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev 
announced on August 1, 2013 that Skolkovo would receive another 100 billion rubles of foreign 
investment in the next eight years.105 The success or failure of the government in this sector 
could have huge repercussions for Russia’s future economic growth, but it appears as though 
hallmarks of Soviet enterprises such as corruption may be a substantial hurdle in Russia’s plans 
for its future. 
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Part III. Codifying Nanotechnology Variables  
 
Moving beyond the historical frameworks, a set of variables that would inform the international 
security implications of emerging technologies and specifically nanotechnology were sought. 
Initially, a set of twelve variables was proposed based on analysis of historical and current 
programs, as well as review and analysis of federally funded nanotechnology programs in the 
United States related to national defense. These programs were identified through participation 
in the annual Nanotechnology for Defense (NT4D) conferences from 2008–2012. The set of 
variables was later reduced to eight. The following variables were identified as significant in 
influencing the development of and driving missions of the nanotech programs in the United 
States:  
 
1. Dual-Use Nature of Nanotechnology: Offensive vs. Defensive Capabilities 
2. Nanotechnology and RMA: Disruptive (Revolutionary) vs. Sustaining (Evolutionary) 
Technology 
3. Maturity of the Nanotech Industry: Institutionalized vs. Transitory Programs 
4. Origin of Technology: Private vs. Public Investment 
5. Institutions: Capacity and Collaboration 
6. Research and Development of Nanotechnology: Overt vs. Covert  
7. Technological Imperative: Tech Driven vs. Tech Pulled 
8. Regulation of Nanotechnology: National vs. International Regulatory Framework 
For each variable framework, the report will include analysis of: 
i. Variable Significance  
ii. IR Theoretical Framework 
iii. Metrics for Assessment and Proposed Assessment Type 
iv. Preliminary Findings 
v. Areas for Continued Research  
We are currently in the process of testing the variables and doing a semi-empirical analysis 
against data from the 2013 and 2014 NT4D conferences. Across all the variables, a score from 0 
to 10 for each variable will allow a single cumulative score to be calculated for a technology or 
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program. A high cumulative score is expected to indicate that a technology is offensive, 
disruptive, institutionalized, privately funded, covert, technologically driven, and regulated by a 
highly restrictive framework. Scores of 5 on all scales indicate that a technology is neutral on 
that measure.  
 




As global interest surrounding nanotechnology continues to grow in both the public and private 
sphere, nations will increasingly seek out both commercial and military applications of such 
emerging technology. The ubiquitous nature of nanotechnology—along with biotechnology and 
information and communications technologies—means that its applications are likely to be far 
reaching. Understanding potential proliferation challenges and threats that may be wielded 
through application of these technologies is critical.106 Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Admiral (Ret.) David E. Jeremiah underscored the necessity of analyzing the 
militarization of innovations achieved in nanotechnology: “Military applications of molecular 
manufacturing have even greater potential than nuclear weapons to radically change the balance 
of power.”107 It is the unique dual-use nature of innovations in nanotechnology that will drive 
advancements in both offensive and defensive capabilities; in a scenario in which a state heavily 
pursues offensive nanotechnology, aggression and conflict are more likely to ensue. However, 
the militarization of advancements made in nanotechnology may not be easily distinguishable as 
either a defensive or offensive capability. This inherent uncertainty will require nations to 
interpret and then react accordingly to adversary and ally nations’ advancements in 
nanotechnology. This leaves the door open for nations to misinterpret capabilities as defensive, 
offensive, or a combination of both, resulting in a security environment at the mercy of an actor’s 
perceptions. Perhaps more importantly, the incentive will be to hedge and assume that 
applications are offensive in the face of substantial technical, operational, and strategic 
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uncertainty. When technological change is perceived to further offensive capabilities, this 
“exacerbates the security dilemma among states, intensify arms races, and make wars of 
expansion, prevention, and preemption more likely.”108  
 
IR Theoretical Framework 
 
The most general prediction of offense-defense theory is that international conflict and war are 
more likely when offense has the advantage, while peace and cooperation are more probable 
when defense has the advantage. Offense-defense theory share the basic assumptions of 
structural realism: states seek to maximize their security by pursuing their self-interests, and  
ultimately their survival, in an anarchic system. However, the offense-defense power theory 
offers an explanation of the relationship between power (resources) and threats. When the 
balance favors the defense, resources are more easily used to counter threats rather than to 
threaten, while if the balance favors the offense, resources are more easily used to threaten rather 
than to counter threats.109 This balance is shaped by a state’s existing amount of resources, 
specifically the existing pool of available technology. Innovation in technology can impact this 
available pool of technology in two ways: the first is innovations that produce weapons that 
result in increased capability at lower costs and the second is commercial technological 
innovations that result in lower production costs of weapons and/or weapon systems.110 Such 
technological advances and resulting efficiencies in cost and performance facilitate states 
adopting offensive strategies and capabilities which, as previously stated, will serve to 
exacerbate the security dilemma among nations.  
 
Metrics for Assessment and Proposed Assessment Type 
 
When analyzing the impact of innovations in nanotechnology, the resulting military applications, 
including novel weapons as well as the expansion of existing capabilities, can be measured in the 
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context of the offense defense balance by understanding the relationship between the attacker 
and the defender as a cost ratio that, when balanced, is equal to one. Utilizing the method 
proposed by Glaser and Kaufmann:111 
 
 R = C_a / C_d 
 
if the cost to the attacker (C_a) is greater than the cost associated with the defender (C_d) then 
the defense is favored (R>1). If the cost of the defense (C_d) is greater than the cost of the 
offense (C_a) then it is in favor of the offense (R<1).112 By adopting Glaser and Kaufmann’s 
method of measurement of the offense-defense theory to analyze the effect of military 
applications of nanotechnology, the cost ratio between the attacker and the defender can still be 
utilized. The means to determining the actual ratio R will result from a qualitative analysis of a 
specific military application of nanotechnology and how it impacts the capability/resource set of 
both the offense and the defense. Upon determining the value of R, a dummy variable could be 
created that will convert R into a categorical or nominal variable: 
• R < 1, R=1, 1 = offense 
• R > 1, R=2, 2 = defense 




The United States Department of Defense (DOD) proposed $289.4 million USD budget for 
nanotech specific research and development in 2013. The proposed DOD nanotech budget is 
broken down into eight program component areas as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: 2013 Proposed DOD Investments by Program Component Area 
(millions USD) 113 
1. Fundamental Phenomena & Processes 138 
2. Nano-materials 32.7 
3. Nano-scale Devices and Systems 95.6 
4. Instrument Research, Metrology & Standards 1 
5. Nano-manufacturing 6.2 
6. Major Research Facilities & Instr. Acquisition 15 
7. Environment, Health, and Safety 1 
8. Education & Social Dimensions 0 
NNI Total $289.4 M 
 
Although no data specifically regarding Russian military spending as it pertains to research and 
development of nanotechnology was identified during this project, statements made by political 
and military elites have underscored Russia’s intent to invest heavily in potential military 
applications of nanotechnology. One such statement was made by then-President Medvedev 
during a speech to the Moscow International Nanotechnology Forum, indicating the perceived 
value of advanced technologies and challenges in October 2009: “what we really need is the 
transfer of high technologies and their adaptation to Russian industries … this is the most 
difficult challenge, and so far in this regard we have had very little success.”114 Russia’s current 
inability to develop innovative nanotechnology is endemic to its military development efforts in 
advanced technology as well. According to one Russian defense analyst, the Russian defense 
industry has “lost… many of its most important technologies” and begun to “lag behind the west 
in communications, reconnaissance, navigation, observation, EW [electronic warfare] and 
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control systems.”115 These ideas were re-affirmed in statements by former First Deputy Defense 
Minister Vladimir Popovkin, who had risen to the rank of general in the Soviet and Russian 
Space Forces, who acknowledged that the Russian “Defense Ministry is forced to purchase 
technologies abroad because Russia’s electronics industry is incapable of manufacturing all 
necessary parts and microcircuits for weapon production.”116 
 
Given the highly secretive nature of the Russian military, it is difficult to find any information 
about either current military R&D or the future uses that the Russian military envisions for 
nanotechnology. What is clear, however, is Russian government officials’ beliefs in the potential 
for nanotechnology to transform their current weapons systems. President Putin’s annual address 
to the Duma in 2007 provided an indication of just how important nanotechnology is for the 
future of the country. Specifically, he announced the creation of a $7 billion project specifically 
to enhance the development of nanotechnology in Russia, an amount of money that was 
unprecedented.117 In fact, the size of the investment means that nanotechnology would receive 
“three times more state funding than the rest of the Russian scientists put together.”118 It is 
impossible to know precisely how much of this money is allocated specifically for military R&D 
and how much will be put toward Putin’s ambitious plans to revive private investment in 
scientific development across all sectors of the economy, but statements by various Russian 
politicians indicate that they are very much aware of nanotechnology’s potential to revolutionize 
their military. Ivanov, for example, stated, “nanotechnology could not only change our whole 
economy and the quality of life for the Russian people but could also drastically change all 
perceptions about modern warfare.”119  
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A particularly interesting piece, published recently by BBC Worldwide Monitoring on December 
3, 2013, provides an uncharacteristically clear picture of the direction the Russian government 
seeks to take its nanotechnology program. The article is a translation of remarks by the Russian 
Deputy Premier Dmitry Rogozin’s November 22 speech entitled “Sixth Generation Technologies 
Will Make It Possible to Print Weapons on Special Printers and to Grow ‘Spare Parts’ for 
Humans.”120 Rogozin explains in his speech the intersection of two key points: first, that sixth 
generation technologies—which he claims began in the 2010s—will allow technologies that 
once seemed like science fiction to become reality, and second, that Russia is in a unique 
position to avoid the United States’ current technological barrier in developing these 
technologies. Specifically, Rogozin argues that the current gap between the United States’ 
research in sixth generation technologies and Russia’s current research may help Russia avoid 
some of the lags in development. As the United States continues to work through the barriers to 
innovation in these technologies, Russia can continue to advance its current research and 
development efforts. By the time Russian research advances to the current level of the United 
States, the technological challenges may be circumvented or solved.  
 
As such, Rogozin posits that Russia can catapult over some of the stages of technological 
development that countries on the cutting edge of research in sixth generation technologies have 
endured. Rather than simply invest in emerging Russian nanotechnology firms, RusNano has 
actively purchased large shares of established corporations in other states. Not only do such 
acquisitions lend some stability to RusNano’s portfolio, but they also allow Russian 
nanotechnology to benefit from their continued innovation without waiting for earlier stages of 
development to be met. RusNano’s recent acquisition of two bioscience firms, BIND and 
Selecta, required the firms to establish subsidiaries in Russia and to “conduct full-cycle drug 
development—from R&D through manufacturing and commercialization.”121 Despite fostering 
growth in these areas, “the depressed state of the economy and turbulence in the financial 
markets is blocking the normal operation of marketing mechanisms of the reproduction of 
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financial, physical, and human capital.”122 Even as he glosses over the current state of Russian 
innovation in these technologies, Rogozin is careful to point out the risk inherent in attempting to 
improve the Russian economy through intense focus in only one sector. Such research is 
imperative not only because of the potential economic implications of success but also to 
maintain an acceptable military-strategic balance with the United States, the European Union, 
and Japan.123  
Although the speech does not provide specific examples of research in nanotechnology or other 
sixth generation technologies, the speech provides an important window into the rhetoric 
surrounding the development of nanotechnology in Russia, and also into the current state of 
research. While the Russian government clearly understands the depth of potential uses for these 
technologies, it does not currently have the capacity needed to compete with on the leading edge. 
Publicly acknowledging its intention to fund high-risk research and to stir investors’ interest in 
“pre-venture funding” indicates what some Western watchers have speculated for years: that 
RusNano, while heavily funded, is far less successful than the government acknowledges. As 
such, it is unlikely that Russian nanotechnology research will move beyond basic research in the 
near future. 
 
Specific examples of Russian research into nanotechnology are most often found in press 
releases. In the last year, Pravda reported on breakthroughs in a nano-enabled oral vaccine for 
hepatitis B, and Putin’s announcement of a new Russian-Kazakhstani Nanotechnology Venture 
Fund created to “encourage innovation cooperation.”124 Interestingly, the most specific coverage 
of potential military applications of Russian nanotechnology is found in the Iranian media. In the 
last five years, the FARS News Agency published articles outlining the specific properties of 
removing atherosclerotic plaque by combining adult stem cells with nanoparticles and of ceramic 
nano-armor for the military and police by the end of 2015.125 
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U.S. military predictions also provide a window into the potential future of Russian military 
capabilities if Russia’s large outlay of funding for nanotechnology proves successful. In many 
cases, discerning U.S. rhetoric from technical reality is as challenging as it is for the case of 
Russia. For example, it has been predicted that the current Russian nanotechnology program may 
soon lead to the development of miniaturized control and power systems that could provide the 
foundation for “massive numbers of inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) capable of 
delivering biotech-engineered weapons.”126 It is hypothesized that such weapons could become 
especially important to the Russian military if Putin’s restructuring of the economy results in 
either the second or third scenario outlined in the 2020 Concept. Should Russia sufficiently 
enhance the efficiency of its energy sector, for example, UAVs might serve an important role in 
helping to protect its resources and the infrastructure that helps deliver those resources to the 
market. Some U.S. observers indicate that in this scenario Russia’s ability to project its authority 
using conventional weapons will extend only to the “near abroad” (i.e., eastern Europe, the 
Caucuses, and central Asia). In such a scenario, Russia would come to rely heavily on UAVs and 
other aircraft to aid in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and conduct near-
autonomous operations.127 As such, it is likely that Russia’s near-to-middle-term goals would 
focus primarily on defensive weapons that are smaller and more autonomous with the addition of 
nanotechnology. Whether or not this is true needs more study. Even with a large population of 
scientists and researchers and an obvious commitment, the technology necessary to begin to 




Analysis of potential military applications of nanotechnology needs to consider the likelihood of 
specific strategic, operational, and tactical uses of nanotechnology. There is a need for robust 
technical cases studies that combine such knowledge with the consideration of motivation and 
intent that will drive the military capability. Such case studies will also help disaggregate 
whether something is intended for offensive or defensive purposes, or perhaps even dual usage. 
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In addition, although funding data was available for DOD-proposed investment in 
nanotechnology broken down by program component area, any comparable Russian military 
nanotechnology funding data was not available. 
 
2. Nanotechnology and RMA: Disruptive vs. Sustaining Technology 
 
Variable Significance  
 
The Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment originally defined a revolution in 
military affairs (RMA) as “a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the 
innovative application of technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military 
doctrine and operational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of 
operations.”128 Are advancements in nanotechnology evidence of an evolutionary outgrowth of a 
new capability or are they in fact a key driver of a new RMA? Is nanotechnology a revolutionary 
technology that will ultimately induce “a fundamental change in who, how, and, perhaps even 
why wars are fought?”129 If nanotechnology emerges as a disruptive innovation, a new market, 
as well as a new value network, will emerge and ultimately serve to replace existing markets and 
value networks.130 Advancements in nanotechnology, as an example of disruptive technology, 
would result in novel capabilities that have the potential to fundamentally change the current 
warfighting environment through the introduction of new offensive as well as defensive 
technologies. By understanding advancements in nanotechnology as an example of an emerging 
disruptive technology, the extent of future military applications is virtually limitless. However, if 
advancements in nanotechnology result in the evolution of existing military capabilities, the 
benefits as well as consequence of new nano-weapons and warfighting capabilities may be as 
unprecedented as the introduction of novel warfighting capabilities that would emerge through 
disruptive innovation.  
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A disruptive technology, by definition, is a technological advancement that drives political and 
societal changes. Although pundits and scholars, along with a few scientists, hypothesize that 
nanotechnology may in fact provide the changes to society and to warfare necessary for it to be 
considered a truly disruptive technology, current deployments of nanotechnology indicate that 
this may not be the case—or at least, not for a very long time. The U.S. National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) provides a list of potential innovations in defense technologies 
that nanotechnology may allow in the future, including: information dominance through 
nanoelectrics; virtual reality systems for training; automation and robotics to offset reductions in 
manpower, reduce risks to troops, and improve vehicle performance; higher-performance 
platforms with diminished failure rates and lower costs; improvements in 
chemical/biological/nuclear sensing and casualty care; improvements in systems for non-
proliferation monitoring; and nano/micromechanical devices for control of nuclear weapons.131  
 
While some are still in the basic research stage, many of these technologies may indeed prove to 
be disruptive when they become a reality. Utilizing robots to augment human soldiers on the 
battlefield, for example, necessitates a variety of changes to current understandings of troop 
movement, operations, and strategy on the battlefield. Similarly, nanoelectrics could allow 
militaries access to enemies’ computer networks in ways that are unforeseen in the world of 
cybersecurity today, creating new threats for government and private industrial sectors. Both of 
these technologies have the potential to revolutionize aspects of civilian life as well. Before 
robots could be trusted on the battlefield, it is conceivable that they would need to prove reliable 
in other roles including, perhaps, as domestic aids for the elderly. Nanoelectrics’ potential to 
revolutionize cybersecurity is perhaps even more disruptive, as it impacts the military, 
government, independent businesses, and individual citizens every day. Should changes to 
cybersecurity become as severe as Roco and Bainbridge claim, it would undoubtedly necessitate 
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IR Theoretical Framework 
 
If nanotechnology is understood to be a “disruptive technology,” then by definition technological 
advances will ultimately drive political and societal changes. Disruptive technology within the 
military can be understood through examining the concept of revolution in military affairs 
(RMA). Nikolai Ogarkov’s writings on the Soviet military during the 1970s and 1980s examined 
the potential revolutionary impact of new military technologies, resulting in what was once 
referred to as the military-technical revolution, an idea that has evolved into today’s concept of 
an RMA.132 Such technological innovation will drive change in existing military technology and 
capabilities, organizational and system structure, and operational innovation. Today there are two 
broad schools of thought about RMA. The first school, developed by Admiral William Owens, is 
known as “systems of systems;” proponents of the “systems of systems” theory believe that 
warfare will be dominated not by individual weapons but by real-time data processing, 
successful integration of capabilities, and information dissemination.133 The second school of 
today’s RMA debate is known as the “vulnerability” school. Proponents of the “vulnerability” 
school argue that the greatest threats posed to the U.S. military are and will continue to be those 
posed by the vulnerabilities of both defensive and offensive systems, including vulnerability to 
enemy cruise, anti-ship, and ballistic missiles; anti-satellite systems; and enemy intrusion into 
and extraction from communication systems.134 Underpinning both schools of thought is that at 
the core of an RMA are technology and the disruptive capabilities that it enables for achieving a 
desired strategic end state.  
 
If technology is in fact at the core of a revolution in military affairs, then it is important to 
understand how revolutions in technology have the ability to influence or shape society. 
Nanotechnology proponents are often noted for underscoring how future advancements in 
nanotechnology will reshape the world and society as we know it.  
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Metrics for Assessment and Proposed Assessment Type 
 
In order to measure the extent to which advancements in nanotechnology are in fact driving a 
technological revolution, a qualitative analysis must be conducted. One possible method is to 
utilize Carlota Perez’s techno-economic paradigm. Perez defines a technological revolution (TR) 
as a “major upheaval of the wealth-creating potential of the economy, opening a vast innovation 
opportunity space and providing a new set of associated generic technologies, infrastructures and 
organizational principles that can significantly increase the efficiency and effectiveness of all 
industries and activities.”135 Utilizing this definition, the industries that emerge from the 
corresponding TRs and the resulting novel infrastructures are binned into one of five 
technological revolutions. The five technological revolution as outlined by Perez include: the 
Industrial Revolution; Age of Steam and Railways; Age of Steel, Electricity, and Heavy 
Engineering; Age of Oil, the Automobile, and Mass Production; and the Age of Information and 
Telecommunications.136 Through employing this qualitative framework, it is possible to expand 
upon the qualitative study conducted by Perez and analyze the extent to which nanotechnology is 
and/or will be categorized as the “sixth” revolution in technology and therefore an example of a 
disruptive technology. 
 
It is unclear, particularly in the case of a “late, late innovator” like Russia, whether the current 
model the government is employing will allow Russia to benefit from the advancements in 
military technology in a significant way. Although Putin continues to espouse his belief in 
nanotechnology’s ability to revolutionize life in Russia, recent actions on the part of the 
government may stymie Russia’s growth. In April 2013, the Accounting Chamber—responsible 
for auditing government programs—accused RusNano of investing approximately $40 million in 
shell companies and further decried the company’s $450 million investment in a silicon factory 
that was not functioning and declared insolvent.137 Furthermore, the Accounting Chamber 
reported that RusNano lost 2.5 billion rubles—approximately $80 million USD—in 2012 and 
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also lost an additional 24.4 billion ruble reserve that the government had formed against potential 
losses from risky ventures. Rather than support the head of RusNano, Putin appeared on a widely 
televised call-in program and spoke in a manner that clearly indicated that the program is out of 
favor with the Kremlin. This is especially problematic for Russia’s current economic plan, which 
had development and eventual privatization of much of the country’s nanotechnology research at 
its center. Given the Russian government’s enormous investment in nanotechnology to this point, 
it is unlikely that this scandal will be problematic for RusNano; however, if the program 
flounders and remains entirely in state control, Russia’s nanotechnology sector runs the risk of 
falling into the inefficient model of innovation outlined by Evangelista. The Russian military 
may eventually undergo change on a large scale due to the introduction of nanotechnology into 
many of its conventional weapons, but the widespread political and societal changes described 
above may never come to fruition. There is a chance, therefore, that nanotechnology may not 




In-depth study is necessary to identify and measure the extent to which the industry of 
nanotechnology has demonstrated or is experiencing, what has been defined as an “upheaval of 
the wealth-creating potential of the economy, opening a vast innovation opportunity space and 
providing a new set of associated generic technologies, infrastructures and organizational 
principles that can significantly increase the efficiency and effectiveness of all industries and 
activities.”138  
 
3. Maturity of the Nanotech Industry: Institutionalized vs. Transitory Programs 
 
Variable Significance  
 
Investment in nanotechnology generally occurs in two waves. Initially, governments will fund 
basic research initiatives. They will then require private investment to commercialize such 
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nanotechnological advancements into industry solutions. It is important to differentiate between 
the two phases of development because in general research programs that are institutionalized 
have the opportunity to mature in well-funded stable environments, while transitory programs, if 
not consumed into an existing institutionalized program often fall into the development gap 
between basic research and commercialization, known as the “valley of death.” Therefore, the 
level the institutionalization of nanotech R&D program serves as a measurement of a program’s 
level of development and maturity.  
 
IR Theoretical Framework 
 
Domestic as well as international organizations and corporations serve as the foundation upon 
which the research and development of nanotechnology is built. Institutions such as universities 
drive basic research initiatives and often work in conjunction with other university institutes 
around the world. Due to the nascent nature of research and development of nanotechnology 
spanning numerous industries, as well as the cost associated with basic research, international 
collaborative initiatives have emerged. Such examples of collaboration can be seen in shared 
research funding between China and the United States.139  
 
Participation of national institutes in international co-operative initiatives can be understood as 
an extension of the participating nations’ self-interests. There is widespread anticipation that 
nanotechnology will be a critical component in addressing global challenges in such areas as 
energy, environment, health care, security, and sustainability. In order for one nation to 
effectively respond to the noted emerging global challenges, it is imperative to glean the most 
from R&D initiatives in the field of nanotechnology. International collaboration is currently the 
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Metrics for Assessment and Proposed Assessment Type 
 
The extent to which nanotechnology has become institutionalized can be measured by the extent 
to which it is used in the manufacturing or as a component of commercialized products. Using 
data gathered from the following sources, this section presents a [qualitative and/or quantitative] 
assessment of the commercial use of nanotechnology: 
 
• Data from 2009 NCMS Study of Nanotechnology in the U.S. Manufacturing 
Industry 
o Nanotechnology Markets and Commercialization Timelines for 2010–
2015 
o Nanotechnology Products Commercialized or In Development (reported in 
2009 NCMS study) 
o Distribution of 270 Responses Across Nine Technology Readiness Levels 
1–9 (as defined by the NCMS study) 
• Data from the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), the Ministry of Education 
and Science of the Russian Federation, the Federal Service for Intellectual 
Property, Patents and Trademarks (Rospatent), the Interstate Statistical 
Committee of the CIS, the OECD, and original methodological techniques of the 
CSRS 
o Nanotechnology section of the 2011 Russian Science and Technology at a 




The National Science Foundation sponsored the National Center for Manufacturing Sciences 
(NCMS) to conduct a study of commercial approaches to nanotechnology from 2008–2010. A 
20-question online survey questionnaire was delivered in mid-2009 to targeted industry 
executives with strategic and technology oversight, and followed up with selected cross-industry 
interviews. Datasets from 270 respondents were analyzed for assessing the viability, 
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competitiveness, and sustainability of U.S. nanotechnology organizations. Important results from 
the study are organized in Table 2.140 
 
Table 2: Results from the National Center for Manufacturing Sciences 
(NCMS) 2009 Survey 
Organization Role in 
Nanomanufacturing  
Over two-thirds of the respondents indicated 
their organizations were directly involved in 
nanomanufacturing value-chains: product 
development, raw materials, processes, 
equipment, and instrumentation. 
Profile of 
Respondents 
50% of the respondents hold senior business 
or technical positions in nanotechnology 
organizations; a higher number of academic 
and research organizations are licensing 





The majority (80%) of organizations are 
involved in collaborations, ranging from 
single-company partnerships to co-creation 
in application-focused partnerships. The 
development of nanotechnology ecosystems 
is progressing with greater differentiation 
and product diversity. 
Interactions with NNI 
Half the respondents (46%) stated their 
organizations had formal interactions with 
NNI projects or accessed specialized 
facilities in the government R&D networks; 
however, less than 5% indicated licensing IP. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 National Center for Manufacturing Sciences, “2009 NCMS Study of Nanotechnology in the U.S. Manufacturing 
Industry,” National Science Foundation, 23 August 2010. 
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Table 2: Results from the National Center for Manufacturing Sciences 
(NCMS) 2009 Survey 
Commercialization 
Timeline 
A significant proportion of respondents 
(25%) indicated their organizations have 
launched commercial nanotechnology 
products. By 2013, nearly 80% of 




A broad range of products incorporating 
nanotechnology are already commercialized 
or in varying stages of development. Early 
applications include: nanomaterials for 
functional coatings, structural 
reinforcements, energy conversion, displays, 
drug delivery, diagnostics, and biomarkers.  
Nanotechnology 
Readiness Levels  
Readiness Levels 4 (TRLs) 1-3 (38% in 
conceptual and early stages of applied 
R&D), and at high TRLs 8-9 (24% nearing 
implementation-readiness). 30% of the 
organizations were working at mid-TRLs 4-
7, which coincide with the “valley of death” 
stage in commercialization potential, in 
which a large amount of resources are 
required to demonstrate a prototype product 
application, document performance, and 




Businesses commercializing nanotechnology 
face a number of technical, business, safety, 
and regulatory challenges. The relative ranks 
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Table 2: Results from the National Center for Manufacturing Sciences 
(NCMS) 2009 Survey 
of the top barriers were generally unchanged 
from the 2005 NCMS Industry Survey, with 
over 50% indicating the lack of investment 
capital as a key barrier. 
U.S. Competitiveness 
in Nanotechnology 
The U.S. presently leads the world in 
commercializing nanotechnology, but over 
two-thirds (70%) of polled executives 
indicated its leadership is threatened by 
foreign competition in nearly every 
application sector. 
 
Russian manufacturing continues to introduce novel nano-enabled products as well as 
incorporating advancements in nanotechnology into improving existing products. Russia 
continues to increase the manufacturing of nano-enabled products, resulting in an approximate 
90% growth between 2008 and 2010 The significant jump in the value of nanotech-manufactured 
products in Russia can be contributed to leap in refined petroleum products output. In 2010, 
Russia introduced $9.9 million USD of novel nano-enabled manufactured products to the world 










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Data from the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian 
Federation, the Federal Service for Intellectual Property, Patents and Trademarks (Rospatent), the Interstate 
Statistical Committee of the CIS, the OECD, and original methodological techniques of the CSRS. 
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Table 3: Russian Nanotechnology-Related Innovation Products of Industry Organizations 







New for the Sales 
Market of 
Organizations 
New for the World 
Market 
  2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
Total 
Manufacturing: 




5.5017 - 16.12 - - - - - - 
Textiles and 
wearing apparel 
- - 0.009 - - - - - - 
Refined petroleum 
products 
- 4.3492 1469 - - - - - - 
Chemicals and 
chemical products 
- 1.3517 4.168 - - 4.168 - - - 
Basic metals and 
fabricated metal 
products 
- 1.177 8.938 - - 5.587 - - - 
Machinery and 
equipment 




8.2663 13.468 63.86 - 5.0389 30.59 - - 1.99225 
Transport 
machinery 
0.3157 0.0552 - 0.3157 0.0552 - - - - 
Materials and 
substances 
0.7111 8.2326 18.18 0.7141 - 0 - - - 
        
RUB USD 
        
1 0.03065 




By 2015, Russia is expected to have produced $900 billion USD worth of nano-enabled 
products. In order to meet achieve this level of production, the necessary revenue goals between 
2008 and 2015 are outlined in Table 4.  142 
 
Table 4: Russian Nano-enabled Products Projected Revenue Goals  
between 2008 and 2015 (in billions of USD) 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Total Investments  0.73 0.86 1.03 1.03 1.05 1.13 1.25 1.48 
Sales of Russian 
Nanoindustry 
Products  0.71 2.86 5.54 8.57 12.14 16.79 23.3 32.14 
Share of World 
Market of 
Nanoindustry 
Products 0.07% 0.25% 0.45% 0.80% 1.25% 1.85% 2.40% 3.00% 
Volume of Exports 
of Nanoindustry 
Products  0.14 0.93 0.68 1.11 1.86 2.89 4.43 6.43 
 
The difference between technoparks and other forms of innovative organizations is that a 
technopark’s initial infrastructure and all initial investments are subsidized by the government. 
Technoparks are an innovative aspect of Russia’s R& D organizational structure, bridging the 
development gap between basic research and product commercialization.143 
 
• The major corporate objective of a technopark is usually formalized in a statutory 
document and is worded more or less like this: “The creation of favorable 
conditions for the development of small and midsize businesses in the sphere of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Julie Bachtold, “Russia Nanotechnology,” OSEC Business Network Switzerland, February 2011.  
143 Igor Ustimenko, “Market Insight: Myths and Realities of Technoparks in Russia,” Gartner, 25 March 2011. 
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scientific-technical innovations and production by creating material and technical, 
economic and social resources for the functioning of such enterprises.”144  
• Russia is developing Nano Teknoparks in Tomak and Novosibirsk (West Siberia), 
Kazan (Tatarstan), Zelenograd (Moscow Region), and Dubna (Moscow 
Region).145 
• Russia’s government has invested a total of $202.8 million USD in the 










Kaluga  17.2 
St. Petersburg 17.7 
Tatarstan 7.8 






Despite the potential for the Russian nanotechnology sector to fall back to the Soviet model of 
military innovation, there are positive indicators that the technology is facilitating growth. 
Russian manufacturing continues to be one of the largest sectors of employment of 
nanotechnology, with a 90% increase in the manufacturing of nano-enabled products between 
2008 and 2010.147 The products are largely employed by the petroleum industry, which accounts 
for much of the growth. However, nano-enabled products are also appearing in the production of 
food and beverages, textiles, chemicals and chemical products, basic and fabricated metal 
products, machinery and equipment, and much more. By 2015, Russia is expected to have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Ibid. 
145 RusNano: USRBC's 18th Annual Meeting “From Silicon Valley to Skolkovo: Forging Innovation Partnerships,” 
Fostering Innovations in Russia through Nanotechnology, October 2010. 
146 Igor Ustimenko, “Market Insight: Myths and Realities of Technoparks in Russia,” Gartner, 25 March 2011. 
147 A. I. Terekhov, “Evaluating the performance of Russia in the research in nanotechnology,” Journal of 
Nanoparticle Research, 2012, 14(11), article: 1250, 3. 
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produced $900 billion in nano-enabled products, bringing it to a projected 3% of the world 




More research needs to be devoted to disaggregating the value added of nanotechnology as it 
pertains to the overall value of the final product. Additional data also needs to be collected on the 
revenue projections of the global nanotechnology industry, as well as more specifically revenues 
of commercialized U.S. nano-enabled products so that a true comparison of the rates of 
commercialization of nanotech products between the U.S. and Russia can be made.  
 




Funding for nanotechnology originates from two primary sources, the first being government and 
the second being private capital either through R&D investment in-house at large corporations or 
through venture capital (VC) funding. Funding within the nanotechnology industry consists of 
five primary phases: basic research, applied science, commercialization, market entry, and 
mature markets.149 In the United States particularly, government funding primarily supports 
basic to applied research and heavily relies on industry to oversee the transfer of technology via 
commercialization. It is argued, however, that even when breakthroughs occur in basic research, 
due to inadequate funding such advancements are unable to make it to a point of 
maturity/acceptable risk that a corporation would be willing to invest.150 Therefore, if a 
technology is in the downstream phase, receiving a majority of private investment its indicative 
of the advanced stage in the development and ultimate commercialization of the technology or 
the industry itself. In addition to indicating the maturity of the technology, the origin of funding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Julie Bachtold, “Russia Nanotechnology,” OESC Business Network Switzerland, February 2011. 
149 Tom Crawley, Pekka Koponen, Lauri Tolvas and Terhi Marttila, “Finance and Investors Model in 
Nanotechnology,” OECD/NNI International Symposium on Assessing the Economic Impact of Nanotechnology 
March 2012. 
150 Ibid.  
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will have implications for the specific areas of development in which it is invested. For example, 
the United States’ National Nanotechnology Initiative released the Supplement to the President’s 
2013 budget151 highlighting the following three signature initiatives: 
 
• Sustainable Nanomanufacturing 
• Solar Energy Collection and Conversion 
• Nanoelectronics for 2020 and Beyond 
 
In total the three signature initiatives were allocated $306 million USD, which was distributed 
amongst specified government agencies and programs.152 Unlike private industry in which 
corporations have the autonomy to innovate freely, programs that originate within government 
are restricted within an assigned area in which to innovate.  
 
While industry strives to produce advanced nano-enabled commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) 
systems, defense industries also continue to conduct research and development of nano-enabled 
military capabilities. However, due to the complex nature of nanotechnology, it is extremely 
difficult to deduce with certainty the range of potential applications by simply being presented 
with advancement in particular nanotechnology. The continued commercialization and 
manufacturing of nano-enabled products/solutions within private industry allow the military to 
apply COTS solutions to expand upon existing military capabilities. However, the extent to 
which military will adopt such nano-enabled COTS systems is still purely speculative. Admiral 
Jeremiah’s comments underscore the potential impact of advancements in nanotechnology either 
pursued independently by military or via the application of a COTS solution.153 In efforts to 
prevent a proliferation in highly destructive nanoweapons, analyzing future applications of 
nanotechnology will direct regulatory initiatives as well as shape the national security landscape 
moving forward. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Subcommittee on Nanoscale Science, Engineering, and Technology Committee on Technology National 
Science and Technology Council, “The National Nanotechnology Initiative: Supplement to the President’s 2013 
Budget.” 
152 Ibid.  
153 David E. Jeremiah, “Nanotechnology and Global Security,” Foresight Conference on Molecular 
Nanotechnology, November 1995. 
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IR Theoretical Framework 
 
The security dilemma provides strong motives for fast innovation because technological 
superiority is a seen as a decisive factor in armed conflict. A nation armed with advanced nano-
enabled capabilities could in theory disarm potential competitors; this would ultimately result in 
an arms race marked with bursts of innovation and the continued degradation of the security 
environment. The lack of transparency and the ambiguity associated with identifying nano-
weapons as either offensive of defensive systems further exacerbates the imbalance of power and 
security dilemma, thus contributing to a potential nano-arms race. 
 
Militaries can benefit from technological advances in civilian technology, primarily in the field 
of information technology, because civilian technology is often more advanced than military 
technology.154 At the same time, the civilian sector can benefit from advancements made in the 
military technology base. As defense budgets shrink, development costs rise, and global 
competition in civilian markets produce continuous innovation at seemingly exponential rates, 
the application of the dual-use approach of integrating of military and civilian technologies is 
increasing.155 As the integration of both military and civilian technologies increases, this further 
complicates identifying technologies as having either civilian or military applications. 
 
Metrics for Assessment and Proposed Assessment Type 
 
• Estimated Total International R&D Funding156  
o (Public and Private) (2001–2010) 
• Total Venture Capital Funding (2001–2010 USD)157 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Derek Braddon, “Commercial Applications of Military R&D: U.S. and EU Programs Compared,” Conference 
Proceedings; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 1999. 
155 Subcommittee on Nanoscale Science, Engineering, and Technology Committee on Technology National 
Science and Technology Council, “The National Nanotechnology Initiative: Supplement to the President’s 2013 
Budget.” 
156 Mihail C. Roco, “The Long View of Nanotechnology Development: The National Nanotechnology Initiative at 
Ten Years.”  
157 Tom Crawley, Pekka Koponen, Lauri Tolvas and Terhi Marttila, “Finance and Investors Model in 
Nanotechnology,” OECD/NNI International Symposium on Assessing the Economic Impact of Nanotechnology 
March 2012. 
Margaret E Kosal – Military Applications of Nanotechnology: Implications for Strategic Security 
	  
66	  
• Final products market: projection for the worldwide market of finite products that 
incorporate nanotechnology  
o Interval Variable: Total Market size USD (private investment) 
o Interval Variable: Total Market size USD (public investment) 
§ Categorize the field of nanotechnology as in the European 
Nanotechnology Landscape Report158 and analyze investment per 




In 2010, Russia’s domestic expenditure on R&D of nanotechnology totaled $1.8 billion USD, 
with expenditure by Russian national corporations such as RusNano totaling over $592 million 
USD, $565 million USD in public funds (both federal and regional), and $12 million USD 
(private funding), as shown in Table 6.159 With only 0.7% of Russia’s nanotech R&D coming 
from private investment, Russia’s nanotechnology industry currently remains heavily influenced 










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Observatory NANO, “The European Nanotechnology Landscape Report.”  
159 Data from the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian 
Federation, the Federal Service for Intellectual Property, Patents and Trademarks (Rospatent), the Interstate 
Statistical Committee of the CIS, the OECD, and original methodological techniques of the CSRS, “Russian 
Science and Technology at a Glance: 2011.” 
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Table 6: R&D 
Institutions Engaged in 
Nanotechnology by 
Ownership  
Intramural Expenditure on R&D 
(millions USD) 
2008 2009 2010 
Total 989.1368 1337.511 1810.146 
Russian Ownership 335.9914 445.8104 592.4737 
   Public 314.9349 428.4809 565.3301 
     Public (Federal) 314.9349 428.3215 565.1032 
     Public (Regional) 0.260525 0.15938 0.22681 
   Private 11.53053 9.63636 12.61554 
   Joint (w/o foreign) 9.51989 7.696215 14.52504 
Joint Ownership with 
both Russian and foreign 
participation 
1.964665 17.40614 59.87171 
 
Russia is currently in the midst of attempting to spur investment in nanotechnology through a 
hybrid model of private and public investment. In this way, the Russian government seems to be 
drawing on the successful creation of nanotechnology in a variety of countries including the 
United States and China, where the government begins the nanotechnology initiative through the 
investment of a large sum of money but gradually reduces the amount of public support as 
private investors begin to invest in various corporations. The Russian government aims to 
stimulate this investment through RusNano and a number of technoparks around the country. 
RusNano was specifically designed to complement the projects funded by the Skolkovo 
Foundation in that RusNano is meant to focus on later-stage projects while Skolkovo is dedicated 
to fostering those in the early stages.160 
 
RusNano sought to attract established nanotechnology corporations to the country by exploiting 
its relatively late entry into the nanotechnology sphere. Rather than simply invest in existing 
Russian corporations, RusNano actively purchased large shares of corporations that needed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 J.Q. Trelewicz, “An Analysis of Technology Entrepreneurship in the Modern Russian Economy exploring SEZ, 
Technoparks, and the Skolkovo Program,” IEEE International Technology Management Conference, 2012, 290. 
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funding to survive. Such moves served two purposes: removing a stable nanotechnology 
company from a rival state while also expanding the Russian nanotechnology center into a 
variety of different industries. For example, in October 2011, RusNano invested a total of $50 
million in two American bioscience firms, BIND and Selecta. While the two companies 
remained based in the United States, both agreed to establish subsidiaries in Russia and to 
“conduct full-cycle drug development—from R&D through manufacturing and 
commercialization—and enhance access to high growth pharmaceutical markets.”161 A cursory 
glance at RusNano’s portfolio of companies reveals projects as diverse as Aquantia Corporation, 
a Silicon Valley-based semiconductor start-up seeking to enhance cloud computing and 
“development of next-generation Ethernet solutions;” LED Microsensor NT, a company 
specializing in the “production of semiconductor optical elements for the mid-infrared 
spectrum;” and TBM, a company that produces “basalt fiber construction materials for Russia’s 
Far East and other regions with permafrost conditions.”162  
 
Such diversity is imperative for both commercial and military advancements in the future, and 
each of these companies might play an important role in future military development. Again, the 
extent to which RusNano funds companies for military R&D is unclear; however, the same 
scientific breakthroughs needed to produce nanoelectric components that will revolutionize 
cybersecurity or lightweight, inexpensive UAVs is needed to create and market next-generation 
Ethernet solutions or basalt fiber construction materials for regions with permafrost conditions. 
The desired outcome or application may be slightly different, but the requisite knowledge is the 
same. As such, it is safe to assume that that the origin of Russia’s military R&D for 
nanotechnology is publically funded and that the government may draw on the breakthroughs of 
scientists working purely in the commercial sector to further its military goals. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 “RusNano Invests in Selecta Biosciences and BIND Biosciences. To Develop and Commercialize Cancer Drugs 
in Russia,” nanowerk, 27 October 2011, par. 3. 
162 “RusNano Portfolio Companies,” RusNano, http://en.rusnano.com/portfolio/companies. 
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By comparison, in 2013, the United States across fifteen federal agencies has a proposed 
nanotech budget of $1.765 billion USD, as shown in Table 7.163 
 
Table 7: Investments by U.S. Agencies 
FY 2009-2013 (millions USD) 





DOE 625.8 373.8 346.2 315.4 442.5 
DHHS / NIH 416.2 456.8 408.6 409.6 408.7 
NSF 509.8 428.7 485.1 426.0 434.9 
DOD 459.0 439.6 425.3 361.2 289.4 
DOC / NIST 136.8 114.7 95.9 95.4 102.1 
NASA 13.7 19.7 17.0 23.0 22.0 
EPA 11.6 17.7 17.4 17.5 19.3 
DHHS / 
NIOSH 6.7 8.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 
DHHS / FDA 6.5 7.3 9.9 11.8 11.1 
USDA / NIFA 9.9 13.2 10.0 10.0 10.0 
DHS 9.1 21.9 9.0 7.0 6.0 
USDA / FS 5.4 7.1 10.0 2.0 5.0 
CPSC 0.2 0.5 1.8 2.0 2.0 
DOT 0.9 3.2 1.0 1.0 2.0 
DOJ 1.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total†  2212.8 1912.8 1847.2 1691.9 1765.0 
      
Continued Research 
Data was not readily available for U.S. private nanotech investment; further research is required. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 “NNI Supplement to the President’s FY 2011 and 2013 Budget,” 
http://nano.gov/sites/default/files/pub_resource/nni_2013_budget_supplement.pdf and 
http://www.nano.gov/NNI_2011_budget_supplement.pdf  
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5. Higher Education and Research Institutes: Indicator of Capacity and Collaboration 
 
Variable Significance  
 
Higher education university and research institutes serve as ground zero for technological 
innovation and collaboration. There is a growing need for engineers who can fill several roles 
required to transform nanotechnology from basic science to commercialized industry solutions. 
In effort to meet that need, programs such as the Nanotechnology Undergraduate Education 
(NUE) Program initiated in 2003 offer support to undergraduate institutions in the following 
areas: curriculum/course development; laboratories and/or modules development; and ethical, 
societal, economic, and environmental implications of nanotechnology.164 Universities and 
research institutes are also recipients of federal grants that fund study in specific areas of basic 
and advanced science. Universities are also often equipped with laboratories stocked with 
advanced technology that are readily available to both staff and students. In addition to the 
collaboration between researchers, professors, and students, the university setting also fosters 
collaboration between universities across fields. Because the need for skilled engineers is so 
high, developed nations are able to reap the benefits of the brain drain from developing countries 
by encouraging foreigners who earn an advanced technical degree not to return home and instead 
to join the pool of domestic scientists.  
 
Metrics for Assessment and Proposed Assessment Type 
 
• Brain Gain 
o Interval variable measuring the percentage of foreigners educated in the 
United States who stay in the United States (undergraduate, graduate, and 
post-doctoral) 
o Interval variable measuring the percentage of all foreign educated citizens 
who stay in the country in which they received their education 
(undergraduate, graduate, and post-doctoral) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Subcommittee on Nanoscale Science, Engineering, and Technology Committee on Technology National Science 
and Technology Council, “The National Nanotechnology Initiative: Supplement to the President’s 2013 
Budget.” 
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• Brain Drain 
o Interval variable measuring the percentage of foreigners educated in the 
United States who leave the United States  
o Interval variable measuring the percentage of all foreign educated citizens 
who leave the country from which they received their education 
(undergraduate, graduate, and post-doctoral) 
• University and higher institutions 
o Number of undergraduate universities that have nanotechnology programs 
§ United States 
§ International 
§ Number of professors and students in the program  
o Number of graduate universities that have nanotechnology programs 
§ United States 
§ International 
§ Number of professors, graduate, and PhD students in the program 




In 2012, 19% of Russia’s total published ISI articles were nano-related while only 10% of the 
United States’ total published ISI articles were nano-related. In 2012, however, the United States 
published 15,154 ISI articles while Russia only published 2,044. The difference in absolute 
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Table 8: U.S. and Russian ISI Nano-Articles 
Total Number of Citations of all Nano-Articles 
 




236,064 204,782 158,483 103,837 45,179 
 
Russia  14,383 11,164 9,143 5,421 2,152 
 
 
Share of Joint Nano-articles Between Countries 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
United 
States 
25.1 32.1 34.9 36.8 38.8 40.5 
Russia 39.9 38.7 37.8 39 36 38.2 
 
Number of ISI Nano-Articles 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
United 
States 
13,542 14,785 15,587 17,409 18,747 15,154 
Russia 2,136 2,342 2,521 2,713 2,845 2,044 
 
Nano ISI Articles as a Percentage of Total ISI Articles 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
United 
States 
4.65% 14.79% 15.59% 5.39% 5.75% 10.10% 
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In 2010, Russia reported 480 nanotech institutions, employing 17,928 researchers. See Table 
9.166 
 
Table 9: Russian R&D Institutions Engaged in Nanotechnology  
by Sector of Performance 
  Institutions Researchers 
  2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 
Total 463 465 480 14873 14500 17928 
Government Sector 165 171 178 6537 6554 7267 
Business Enterprise 
Sector 128 128 134 5654 4330 5608 
Higher Education 
Sector 168 164 167 2652 3581 5022 
Private Non-Profit Sector 2 2 1 30 35 31 
 
The Russian institution that has produced the most nanotech related publications between 1976 
and 2007 is the Russian Academy of Science with a total of 6,773 publications; Moscow Mv 
Lomonosov State University produced the second highest number of publications totaling 1,421. 
See Table 10 for the comprehensive listing of the top ten institutions in nanotechnology paper 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Data from the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian 
Federation, the Federal Service for Intellectual Property, Patents and Trademarks (Rospatent), the Interstate 
Statistical Committee of the CIS, the OECD, and original methodological techniques of the CSRS, “Russian 
Science and Technology at a Glance: 2011.” 
167 Xuan Liu, Pengzhu Zhang, Xin Li, Hsinchun Chen, Yan Dang, Catherine Larson, Mihail C. Roco, and Xianwen 
Wang, “Trends for nanotechnology development in China, Russia, and India,” Journal of Nanoparticle 
Research, November 2009, 11(8). 
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Table 10: Top 10 institutions in nanotechnology paper publication in Russia 
(1976–2007) 







1 Russian Academy of Sciences 443 989 6,773 
2 
Moscow Mv Lomonosov State 
Univ 
78 225 1,421 
3 AF Ioffe Phys Tech Institute 67 53 649 
4 St Petersburg State University 23 73 397 
5 Ufa State Aviat Tech University 10 18 194 
6 
Joint Institute of Nuclear 
Research 
5 30 140 
7 Boreskov Inst Catalysis 10 19 137 
8 Si Vavilov State Opt Inst 6 11 135 
9 Novosibirsk State University 9 0 110 
10 Technical University 5 27 106 
 
As discussed above, the Russian government has made a concerted effort in recent years to 
improve the collaboration between universities and research institutes. The fruits of these efforts 
are beginning to emerge in the country’s nanotechnology industry, where universities now 
employ a number of researchers comparable to the research institutes. Despite a loosening of the 
restrictions on universities’ ability to collaborate with research institutes, deep similarities in the 
structure of Russian scientific research remain. The RAS continues to dominate other research 
institutes in the country in almost every measure of research about nanotechnology. Seven RAS 
institutes are among the most prolific publishers in the field of nanotechnology in the country, 
mirroring the state of the research sector under the Soviet Union.168 While Moscow State 
University (MSU) boasts a larger number of publications since laws allowing collaboration 
between universities and research institutes were passed in 2006, it is increasingly difficult to 
disaggregate which papers are truly written and published by members of the university 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 A. I. Terekhov, “Evaluating the performance of Russia in the research in nanotechnology,” Journal of 
Nanoparticle Research, 2012, 14 (11), 1250, 11. 
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community and which were authored primarily by researchers for the RAS who split their time 
between a research institute and a university. As such, while the universities seem to be gaining 
legitimacy and recognition within the Russian R&D community, it is entirely possible that the 
new laws simply created a scenario where universities and research institutes operate in much the 
same way but manipulate the data to their advantage.  
 
If this is the case, it once again underscores the similarities between the contemporary Russian 
Federation and the Soviet Union. Not only do universities in many countries serve as an 
important incubator for technological advancement and innovation by allowing researchers in 
university laboratories to experiment freely, but, as discussed above, incorporating universities 
into RAS research institutes could help eliminate the “brain drain” that plagues scientific 
research in the country currently. If cooperative agreements are made between research institutes 
and universities purely for show rather than to enhance the flow of information between the two, 
many of the benefits ascribed to this relationship will fail to appear in Russia.  
 
Despite the uncertainty about where well-respected nanotechnology research is originating in the 
R&D apparatus, however, authors and individual research institutions are beginning to make 
their mark in particular areas of nanotechnology research. Terekhov was able to isolate both the 
most prolific individual authors and the most prolific institutions in the field. Searching the 
Science Citation Index Expanded (SCIE) for a variety of terms related to nanotechnology 
indicated that nearly 12.1% of the publications with more than 100 citations were focused on 
nanophotonics. The three most-cited articles in this subset came from scientists at the Institute 
for Physics of Microstructure, the Institute for Spectroscopy (IS) and the Shubinikov Institute of 
Crystallography (IC), all of which are part of the RAS.169 Nine publications focusing on “nano-
bio-med” also were cited more than 100 times each, indicating that the papers are gaining some 
recognition worldwide. These publications are far more widespread in the RAS and university 
systems, however. Authors of these articles hail from the Blokhin Russian Cancer Research 
Center of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences (RAMS), the Schenov Moscow Medical 
Academy, the Moscow Research Institute of Medical Ecology, the Research Institute of Human 
Morphology RAMS, the MSU, and the Shemyakin-Ovchimnikov Institute of Bioorganic 
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Chemistry (IBC) RAS. This is perhaps indicative of a greater amount of collaboration between 
universities and research institutes in this area than in other fields of nanotechnology research.  
 
While the number of times an article is cited provides a measure of the quality of the work 
produced from a given university or research institute, isolating the most prolific authors and 
determining where they work also helps determine the nature of the research being pursued in a 
given institution. Table 11 summarizes these findings.170 
 
Table 11: Research Direction and Institution of Most Prolific Russian Authors, 1990–2010  
 
Name of Scientist Institution Research Direction 




I.A. Ovid’ko IPME RAS 
Mechanics of 
nanomaterials 
Y.D. Tretyakov DMS MSU 
Functional 
nanomaterials 
E.D. Obraztsova GPI RAS Carbon nanostructures 
A.M. Zheltikov DP MSU Nanophotonics 
S.V. Ivanov PTI RAS 
Semiconductor 
nanostructures 
V.K. Ivanov IGIC RAS 
Functional 
nanomaterials 
A.V. Okotrub NIIC SB RAS Carbon nanostrucutres 
V.G. Dubrowskii PTI RAS 
Semiconductor 
nanostructures 
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This combination of lenses gives some idea of the research going on in the Russian research 
institutes and universities: PTI RAS has some focus on semiconductor nanostructures, IS RAS 
some focus on the physics of nanostructures, IPME RAS on the mechanics of nanomaterials, 
IGRIC RAS on functional nanomaterials, and NIIC SB RAS on carbon nanostructures. Perhaps 
more interesting is the fact that, while the work on nanophotonics produced by Russian authors 
caught the attention of the international community during this time, only one of the country’s 
most prolific authors researches in that field. This might indicate that work on nanophotonics is 
more widespread throughout the R&D apparatus than research on semiconductor nanostructures 
appears to be. 
 
Reviewing the RusNano portfolio on its website indicates a somewhat similar breakdown of 
research priorities. RusNano divides its portfolio into six technological fields: nanomaterials, 
optics and electronics, medicine and pharmacology, energy efficiency, coating and surface 
modification, and other. These technological fields comprise 44%, 10%, 17%, 15%, 10%, and 
4% of the portfolio respectively.171 Such a breakdown seems to align roughly with the specifics 
that Terekov’s study unveiled. Nanomaterials seem to comprise the largest portion of research 
into nanotechnology, pharmaceuticals the second largest, and so on.  
 
Also of interest is that Russian collaboration with international scientists appears especially 
strong in nanotechnology research. Although nanotechnology articles by Russian scientists were 
not frequently cited in an examination of articles included on the Science Citation Index 
Expanded database—articles authored solely by Russian scientists averaged only 5.1 citations—
articles that Russian scientists collaborated on with foreign scientists received an average of 42.3 
citations.172 While not a scientific measure, this could be indicative of Russian nanotechnology 
researchers receiving the support Russia seeks to foster between its universities and research 
institutes from foreign researchers and universities. This is not an ideal solution to the problem at 
hand, but it may indicate that Russian researchers are exposed to more liberal thinking and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Nikita Dulnev, “Rusnano’s Big Nanotechnology Secrets Revealed,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, 3 August 
2011, par. 2. 
172 A. I. Terekhov, “Evaluating the performance of Russia in the Research in Nanotechnology,” Journal of 
Nanoparticle Research, 2012, 14 (11), 1250, 11. 
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innovation than solely studying the domestic relationship between Russian research institutes 




More research is needed in order to measure reverse brain drain. Further data needs to be 
collected to calculate the percentage of foreigners educated in the United States who stay in the 
United States (undergraduate, graduate, and post-doctoral) and the percentage of all foreign 
educated citizens who stay in the country in which they received their education (undergraduate, 
graduate, and post-doctoral). Data also needs to be collected to effectively measure for brain 
drain: the percentage of foreigners educated in the United States who leave the United States as 
well as the percentage of all foreign educated citizens who leave the country from which they 
received their education (undergraduate, graduate, and post-doctoral). 
 




As the nanotechnology industry continues to advance, voluntary transparency in both private 
industry as well as defense industries will prove to be a critical component in confidence 
building between nations. Transparency is integral in private industry to mitigate the fears and 
public distrust of nano-enabled products as well as nano-manufacturing. Transparency will serve 
to separate facts from fiction that surrounds societal implications of nanotechnology. One such 
science fiction scenario famously introduced by the “father of nanotechnology,” Eric Drexler, is 
that of “grey goo.” In this scenario, self-replicating nano-machines or nano-bots run amok and 
take over the world.173 The spread of this wildly speculative doomsday scenario was pervasive 
enough that, after reading a report issued by the ETC Group, a Canadian watchdog organization 
on nanotechnology,174 Prince Charles publically proclaimed his distress.175 This notional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Lawrence Osborne, “The Gray-Goo Problem,” The New York Times Magazine (book summary), December 
2003. 
174 “The Big Down,” The ETC Group, January 2003. 
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scenario is an example of how a lack of transparency associated with the research, development, 
and manufacturing of an emerging technology leads to an unfounded societal paranoia and fear 
of the emerging technology.  
 
A lack of transparency about an emerging technology not only negatively effects public 
perception but also negatively impacts the perceived balance of powers in the existing security 
environment. Due to the ambiguity associated with categorizing military applications of 
nanotechnology as either offensive or defensive in nature, the stability of the security 
environment will inevitably be compromised. Lack of transparency in the research, development, 
and manufacturing of emerging technologies also makes it extremely difficult to regulate. Even 
if a transnational regulatory framework is established, it is impossible to determine if a nation is 
non-compliant if one is unable to determine the entire scope of research, development, or 
manufacturing. 
 
Like so much else in Russia’s development of nanotechnology, the amount of transparency 
offered by the government is somewhat of a hybrid. President Putin and other high-ranking 
members of the government have made no secret of their desire to transform Russia into a great 
power by stimulating the economy through investment in scientific research and development. 
The focal point of this investment is the government’s $7 billion investment in nanotechnology. 
RusNano, the government’s nanotechnology investment arm, has a very detailed website that 
includes links to a variety of information about the projects and companies in its portfolio, which 
seems to suggest Russia’s development of nanotechnology is overt. RusNano’s willingness to 
partner with foreign firms including MIT also indicates a willingness to share information with 
other states that is uncharacteristic of the Soviet government during the Cold War. 
 
Finding information about the specific research that the Russian military is conducting on 
nanotechnology is extremely difficult, however, which prevents Russia’s development of 
nanotechnology from being classified as overt. It is possible to piece together some educated 
guesses about the sectors of nanotechnology that are most attractive to the Russian government 
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from records of government hearings and from those areas of defense where Russia has 
historically dominated. One of these is the aeronautics and space programs, which some military 
analysts predict will serve as the basis for Russia’s attempts to navigate around improved sensors 
and radar. Specifically, analysts assert that nanobots and nanomachines will become central in 
this effort due to their inherent stealth properties.176 Such innovations are hypothesized as 
critical for Russia’s military. Due to demographic shifts, the Russian population is aging rapidly 
without the possibility of replacement.177 Therefore, it is speculated that the Russian army will 
lose the mass that formed the basis of its military capacity for centuries, which will force the 
leadership to find practical, relatively inexpensive ways to overcome the lack of manpower. 
Nanotechnology, if embraced and developed, is put forward as having the potential to help 




Although it will be impossible to research the covert nanotechnology research and development 
programs currently being conducted throughout the world, it is possible to record information on 
all publically released military nanotechnology research and development.  
 
7. Technological Imperative: Tech Driven vs. Requirements Pulled 
 
Variable Significance  
 
Those who subscribe to the ideology of the “technological imperative” believe that if something 
is technically possible then action ought to, must, or inevitably will be taken; as Daniel Chandler 
explains, “the information technology revolution is inevitably on its way and our task as users is 
to learn to cope with it.”178 If one were to apply the ideology of the technological imperative to 
understanding potential future implications of advancements of nanotechnology on society, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Theodore C. Hailes et. al. “Resurgent Russia in 2030: Challenges for the USAF,” Center for Strategy and 
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177 Ibid.  
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would suggest that a revolution in nanotechnology will drive changes to policy and ultimately 
society. As public opinion of advancements in nanotechnology wavers amid rumored 
consequences that mirror something out of a science fiction movie, the public continues to call 
for government interference and regulation to ensure the safety and health of the general 
population.  
 
While Putin and other government leaders continue to place a great deal of emphasis on 
nanotechnology’s potential to pull Russia back into the position of a great power, it would seem 
that the implementation of the technological imperative is incomplete at best. Soviet military 
innovation was very slow to embrace new technologies, even if scientists had the ability to 
develop the technology. This pattern of slow or incomplete innovation serves as the foundation 
of Adamsky, Evanaglista, and Radosevic’s critiques of the government. Such systemic resistance 
to innovation seems to indicate that the technological imperative did not drive Soviet adoption of 
military technology. 
 
Contemporary Russia is more difficult to classify given the government’s heavy investment in 
nanotechnology in recent years. Although the government’s reliance on nanotechnology 
indicates a desire to invent anything and everything that might aid the growth of the Russian 
economy, the development of nanotechnology in the country is so recent that only small changes 
are evident. If a technological imperative is driving innovation in the country, signs of social and 
political change would likely be more evident. Perhaps an argument could be made that the 
government’s desire to spur private investment in RusNano and Skolkovo is indicative of a 
fundamental shift in the manner in which the government approaches innovation, but such an 
argument is weak. RusNano and Skolkovo are first and foremost government entities and will 
remain so for the foreseeable future, particularly if RusNano is truly out of favor with the 
government and therefore unable to engage in the first sell off of the corporation next year.179 As 
such, it is difficult to determine how much the government understands of the process of 
successful innovation is predicated on a top-down model of government involvement and how 
much relies on foreign investment. Understanding this frame of reference is important because it 
allows for a clearer picture of the amount of societal and political change that nanotechnology is 
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creating in the country. If the government truly desires a more open, liberal approach to 
nanotechnology innovation, it might be indicative of the political and societal changes that a 
technology driven revolution causes. If, however, RusNano and the more liberal policies are 
simply included in the laws governing innovation to give the appearance of change, the 




Categorizing or measuring whether a technological innovation can be considered tech driven or 
requirements pulled is difficult. However, there are indicators of whether or not a technology can 
be considered tech driven; for example, a tech-driven technology results in documentable 
societal changes, such as regulation. Qualitatively, a case can be made for nanotechnology as a 
tech-driven innovation revolution by applying a similar framework as was proposed in the 
discussion of the second variable in which innovation was measured through Carlota Perez’s 
techno-economic paradigm.  
 
This work will also be expanded to address DOD’s uses of tech driven versus requirements 
pulled in acquisitions. 
 
8. Regulation of Nanotechnology: National vs. International Regulatory Framework 
 
Variable Significance  
 
Many take the view that “[n]anotechnology is so new and so untested for potential effects on 
human health that we do not even know what we don’t know.”180 Advancements in the field of 
nanotechnology have already made it into common consumer products including household 
appliances, automobiles, electronics and computers, food and beverages, children’s toys, textiles, 
paints, cleaning materials, and even sunscreen.181 Although many of the risks associated with 
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nano-enabled products are remote and hypothetical, concerns about the potential consequences 
of nanotechnology and its applications have been voiced. Such concerns include worker safety in 
the manufacture or use of nanotechnology-based goods; consumer safety; environmental damage 
caused by manufacturing waste and finished goods that may contaminate air, water or soil; 
unforeseen consequences of uncontrolled nanotechnology; and potential military applications.182 
Due to these concerns, calls for increasing regulation are not uncommon; however, 
overregulating an industry in its nascent stage may be counter-productive and hinder potential 
innovation with deleterious impact on our national security.   
 
Aside from regulation due to environment, health, and public safety concerns, standardization 
initiatives within the field of nanotechnology are very important to streamline research and to 
encourage collaboration across borders, fields of study, and industry. Joint standardization efforts 
will be an important contributor to continued growth and research and development of 
nanotechnology. 
 
IR Theoretical Framework 
 
Implementing a national regulatory framework will not be sufficient to regulate nanotechnology. 
Although national regulatory frameworks are best able to promote international competition and 
diversity in research and development, national approaches may also result in a “race-to-the-
bottom in environmental and labor standards,” and may be unable to control potential security 
risks.183 The speculative risks associated with nanotechnology are in fact cross-boundary issues 
such as potential environmental dangers. Separating hype from technical reality are crucial 
factors that are frequently not adequately addressed, e.g., grey goo. Any transnational regulatory 
framework will have to weigh factors across sectorial boundaries, as well as to speed research 
and development through sharing expertise and resources and confidence-building measures.  
 
Metrics for Assessment and Proposed Assessment Type 
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• Existing nanotech regulatory bodies 
o Number of regulatory agencies in each country 
o Number of agencies that oversee the regulation of nanotechnology 
• Number of international organizations that focus on the regulation of nanotechnology 
• Permissive regulation 




The National Economic Council (NEC), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the 
Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR) led a multi-agency consensus-based process to develop a set of 
principles to guide development and implementation of policies for the oversight of 
nanotechnology applications and nanomaterials. The U.S. federal government has significantly 
increased funding on the environmental, health, and safety dimensions of nanotechnology, from 
$37.7 million in fiscal year (FY) 2006 to $123.5 million in FY 2012.184 
 
In addressing issues raised by nanomaterials, agencies will adhere to the 
Principles for Regulation and Oversight of Emerging Technologies. 
Specifically, to the extent permitted by law, federal agencies will: 
1 
To ensure scientific integrity, base their decisions on the best available 
scientific evidence, separating purely scientific judgments from judgments of 
policy to the extent feasible 
2 
Seek and develop adequate information with respect to the potential effects of 
nanomaterials on human health and the environment and take into account new 
knowledge when it becomes available 
3 
To the extent feasible and subject to valid constraints (involving, for example, 
national security and confidential business information), develop relevant 
information in an open and transparent manner, with ample opportunities for 
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In addressing issues raised by nanomaterials, agencies will adhere to the 
Principles for Regulation and Oversight of Emerging Technologies. 
Specifically, to the extent permitted by law, federal agencies will: 
stakeholder involvement and public participation 
4 
Actively communicate information to the public regarding the potential benefits 
and risks associated with specific uses of nanomaterials  
5 
Base their decisions on an awareness of the potential benefits and the potential 
costs of such regulation and oversight, including recognition of the role of 
limited information and risk in decision making  
6 
To the extent practicable, provide sufficient flexibility in their oversight and 
regulation to accommodate new evidence and learning on nanomaterials 
7 
Consistent with current statutes and regulations, strive to reach an appropriate 
level of consistency in risk assessment and risk management across the Federal 
Government, using standard oversight approaches to assess risks and benefits 
and manage risks, considering safety, health and environmental impacts, and 
exposure mitigation 
8 
Mandate risk management actions appropriate to, and commensurate with, the 
degree of risk identified in an assessment.  
9 
Seek to coordinate with one another, with state authorities, and with 
stakeholders to address the breadth of issues, including health and safety, 
economic, environmental, and ethical issues (where applicable) associated with 
nanomaterials 
10 
Encourage coordinated and collaborative research across the international 
community and clearly communicate the regulatory approaches and 
understanding of the United States to other nations. 
Adapted from OSTP Memorandum: Policy Principles for the U.S. Decision-Making Concerning 
Regulation and Oversight of Applications of Nanotechnology and Nanomaterials, 9 June 2011.185 
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The proposed regulatory framework does not identify a singular definition of what is classified 
as “nanotechnology.” This report argues that for the purposes of oversight and regulation, the 
critical issue is whether and how such new or altered properties and phenomena emerging at the 
nano-scale create or alter the risks and benefits of a specific application. A focus on novel 
properties and phenomena observed in nano-materials may ultimately be more useful than a 
categorical definition based on size alone. 
 
Despite nanotechnology’s growing use in everyday items such as household appliances, 
automobiles, and sunscreen, national and international regulatory frameworks have yet to be 
established. Currently, there is very little federal legislation regulating the development and 
application of nanotechnology in Russia. Additionally, there are no laws containing technical 
regulations for ongoing projects.186 Perhaps the closest that Russia comes to a framework of 
regulation is the Concept of Toxicological Research, which provides a methodology of risk 
assessment and methods for an identification of quantitative detection of nanomaterials. Issued in 
2007, this concept includes descriptions and characteristics of new properties and behavior of 
nanomaterials in environmental and biological objects, the necessity of studying the effects of 
ingesting each nanomaterial, an analysis of data about the safety of the manufacturing and use of 
nanomaterials, and the procedure for the oversight of nanotechnology research.187 Other 
important regulations issued by the government include the “Assessment on Nanomaterials’ 
Safety,” and the “Policy of Nanotechnologies Classification.”188 Some departments within the 
federal government have also attempted to fill gap by issuing regulation of their own. The Public 
Health Ministry of the Russian government issued an order on August 5, 2009, which authorized 
a working group to “organize a development of subordinate and methodical documents covering 
questions of nanomaterials’ and nanotechnologies’ safety and methods of Nanosafety Risk 
Assessment.”189  
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Further research is needed in order to capture the ongoing international dialogue surrounding the 
creation of a global nanotech regulatory framework as well as any emerging regional regulatory 
nanotech frameworks.  
 
Part IV. Conclusions and Future Directions 
 
The ultimate goal, which is beyond the scope of an initial one-year project, is to develop new 
theoretical frameworks to explain variable approaches to the development of strategically 
significant nanotechnology and emerging science programs; to understand their impact on 
security; to enable mechanisms for the world to govern the implications of its own ingenuity; and 
to inform security, defense, and foreign policies.  
 
The development of military applications for nanotechnology in the Russian Federation could be 
perceived as a threat to international security and could spark counter-militarization by states 
such as the United States, Western Europe, Poland, Ukraine, and Georgia due to the security 
dilemma. Some Russian elites claim to be militarizing nanotechnology in response to the alleged 
military advances of the United States. However, the Russian Federation does not currently pose 
a threat to the international community due to its inability to convert nanotechnology research 
into development as a result of financial mismanagement and changing views on the 
infrastructure. The international community recognizes this lack of a threat and therefore the 
security dilemma is less likely to cause mass militarization and mobilization by states feeling 
threatened. 
 
This work establishes a codified variable approach to the development of strategically significant 
nanotechnology and emerging science programs, with the eventual goal of enabling cross-
national comparisons. Critical factors in the role and significance of emerging technologies, e.g., 
institutional, ideational, or technical, have been identified. The application of these variables and 
their assessment against new data, interviews, and field work done by the author will be explored 
in future work. 
